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Preface 
In the general history of pre-Modern civilizations, a single 
century is a very brief period. In the fifty some generations 
of Muslim history, three or four generations hardly suffice 
to indicate any long-term trend. Yet the depression of 
Islamicate social and cultural life in the late seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries does stand out in retrospect. This 
is so chiefly in the light of what followed. With the 
nineteenth century came the utter collapse of the strong 
Muslim posture in the world: that nothing was done in the 
eighteenth century to forestall this smacks of inexplicable 
weakness or folly. But the sense that there was a depression 
also reflects the actualities of the Muslim lands in the 
eighteenth century itself…Though the eighteenth century 
was not without its interesting and creative figures, it was 
probably the least notable of all in achievement of high-
cultural excellence; the relative barrenness was practically 
universal in Muslim lands. The strongest Muslim 
governments all found themselves subject to internal 
political disintegration…Such phenomena, which suggest 
some degree of decline in social or cultural power, can be 
called ‘decadence if one is careful not to assume any long-
term trend without further evidence.  They represented 
more than coincidence among diverse lines of 
development; in part, at least, they doubtless answered to 
potent common circumstances in the lands of Islam. 
 
--Marshall Hodgson1 
 
 In perhaps the most celebrated history of Islamic civilization in English, Marshall 
Hodgson laments the desiccation and decline of the Islamic world by the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.  As the early modern period progressed, the undeniable political 
weakness of the great Muslim empires—the Ottomans, Mughals, and Safavids—had 
become increasingly apparent.  This decline was long in the making—the beginnings of 
Ottoman weakness, for instance, could be traced at least back to the late seventeenth 
                                                 
1 Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1974), 3: 134. 
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century, in its second unsuccessful siege of Vienna in 16832—and came into a climax by 
the nineteenth century: by then, it was clear that the political viability of the Islamic 
Middle East and South Asia had become existentially compromised.  The majestic 
dynasties of yesteryear had now become either defunct or near-defunct, and their territory 
had largely fallen into the hands of European colonialists.  Hodgson may be embellishing 
to an extent with his frustrations over Muslim social and cultural under-achievement 
during this period, but one thing is certain: by the nineteenth century, Muslims had been 
politically eclipsed by the forces of Western Europe.   
 Disillusioned with their loss of power, and with their newfound position of 
subservience vis-à-vis their European counterparts, a critical mass of Muslim scholars 
and intellectuals tried to make intelligent sense of what led to the umma’s dethronement.  
In so doing, many posited radical reforms meant to revive the Muslim community, and 
restore it to its previous position of prominence.  The character of these reformist efforts 
naturally varied considerably from region to region, depending on the particular nuances 
of each Muslim land’s experience with European colonialism. As Fazlur Rahman 
succinctly describes, the particular character of reformist efforts was accounted for 
largely by four factors:  
(1) whether a particular cultural region retained its 
sovereignty vis-à-vis the European political expansion and 
whether it was dominated and governed de jure or de facto 
by a European colonial power; (2) the character of the 
organization of the ulema, or religious leadership, and the 
character of their relationship with the governing 
institutions before the colonial encroachment; (3) the state 
of the development of Islamic education and its 
accompanying culture immediately before the colonial 
encroachment; and (4) the character of the overall colonial 
                                                 
2 Elizabeth Sirriyeh, Sufis and Anti-Sufis: The Defence, Rethinking and Rejection of Sufisn in the Modern 
World (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1999), 28. 
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policy of the particular colonizing power—British, French, 
or Dutch.3 
 
Accordingly, Islamic reform movements in the early modern period were markedly 
different in, for instance, India under British colonial rule than in Indonesia under the rule 
of the Dutch.  But their nuances aside, reform initiatives were all united in their putative 
desire to revive and uplift of global Islamdom—spiritually, religiously, and often 
politically.   
 Sufi intellectuals and Sufi movements were deeply active these reformist efforts.  
Often perceiving the Muslim community’s loss in material and political stature as 
evidence of deep moral transgressions, Sufi-inspired reform efforts frequently manifested 
themselves as acts of spiritual purification, aimed at regaining their lost stature in the 
eyes of Allah:  
Yet there must be much in the wider common experience as 
well as in the particular circumstances of individual regions 
and districts and their traditions to help account for the new 
features. Loss of political power and economic collapse 
may be perceived as consequences of a loss of God's favour 
through failure to live as true Muslims and thus breed a 
heightened awareness of the need for the community as a 
whole to regain this lost favour through a programme of 
moral reform. The achievement of this would frequently be 
seen to necessitate efficient mass organization, 
implementation of Sharīʿa and the pursuit of the ideal 
Islamic state.4 
 
For instance, following the Sepoy Revolt of 1857, in which the British quite literally 
nearly destroyed the vestiges of Indian Islam in the celebrated Mughal cities of Delhi and 
Lucknow, the Sufi-inspired Deobandi and Barelwi movements emerged to protect 
                                                 
3 Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1984), 43.  
 
4 Elizabeth Sirriyeh, Sufis and Anti-Sufis, 12. 
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Islamic civilization in India from further encroachment by the British, through inward 
spiritual repair.5  Both movements, despite being seen as visceral rivals, were ultimately 
united by their desire to institutionalize their efforts at spiritual reform through education: 
through the great madrasa of Deoband, and the series of Barelwi educational institutes 
throughout North India (most famously the Madrasa Manzar al-Islam), the Deobandi and 
Barelwi leadership sought to train a new generation of Muslims properly grounded in 
Islamic thought and spirituality, which would in turn produce Indian Muslim leaders fully 
capable of preserving the legacy of Indo-Muslim society against the advances of the 
British.   
Neither the Deobandi and Barelwi movements, in contradistinction to the point 
made above by Sirriyeh, were willing to organize politically against the British; realizing 
that the British were too strong to be dealt with militarily, both movements decided that 
their reform efforts would be best led as politically quietist movements.  Still, other Sufi 
reformists were not necessarily quietist in their political outlook.  Many Sufi orders, as 
Sirriyeh suggests, were actively engaged in mass political organization, with the putative 
goal being the implementation of Sharīʿah, and the establishment of an Islamic state.  In 
this context, it is not altogether unsurprising that Sufi leaders and orders were often at the 
front lines of direct resistance to European colonial forces.  In the Northern Caucus, 
Naqshbandī and Qādirī orders were instrumental in resisting Russian advances, and in 
Libya the Sanūsī order was equally active in fighting Italian colonialist efforts.  But 
politically quietist or otherwise, Sufi reformers were ultimately united by an inward 
                                                 
5 For more on the Deobandi movement, see Barbara Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 
1860-1900 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007).  For more on the reform movement led by Ahmed 
Reza Khan Barelwi, see Usha Sanyal, Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmad Riza Khan 
Barelwi and his Movement, 1870 – 1920 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
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desire to spiritually repair the umma, which may or may not have outwardly manifested 
itself in political activity.   
Other Muslim reformers during this period, on the other hand, were less interested 
in inward purification than in outward—and by this I specifically here mean material—
reform of their religious tradition.  Exasperated by their societies’ inability to have 
socially and intellectually dealt with the new societal challenges brought on by the advent 
of modernity, these intellectual reformers sought to reconcile Islamic belief and practice 
with the needs of the modern world.  Voraciously engaging the Qurʿān and other 
foundational Islamic texts, these modernist Muslim intellectuals argued that Islamic 
civilization was politically bested by the forces of Europe because of its unwillingness to 
sufficiently make use of reason.  Reason and critical thinking, they continue, was 
foundational to the Islamic religious and intellectual tradition, only to have been more 
recently been discouraged and suppressed by dogmatic and pedantic religious scholars.  
By reestablishing the primacy of reason in Islamic thought, Islamic modernists argue, 
Muslims will be sufficiently equipped deal with the needs of the modern world.  Pursuant 
to that goal, modernists openly embraced the use of the natural sciences and philosophy 
as prerequisites to material progress.  As Qasim Zaman eloquently details, Islamic 
modernism often appeared to establish a concordance between Islamic religious belief 
and the tenets of liberal rationalism.  
Modernist Muslim intellectuals have sought, since the 
nineteenth century, to find ways of making Islam 
compatible with what they have taken to be the challenges 
of the modern age. And their proposed reforms have 
encompassed virtually the entire spectrum of life in Muslim 
societies. The intellectual vigor with which these reforms 
were proposed, and the success with which they have been 
carried through—often in alliance with the postcolonial 
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state—has varied from one Muslim society to another, as 
have the precise ways in which different thinkers among 
these modernists have viewed the Islamic intellectual and 
religious tradition and defined themselves in relation to it. 
More often than not, however, the effort has been to 
retrieve the teachings of “true” Islam from the vast and 
oppressive edifice that centuries of “sterile” scholasticism, 
“blind” imitation of earlier authorities, and the 
“intransigence” of the religious specialists had built. In 
general, the modernist project is guided by the assurance 
that once retrieved through a fresh but “authentic” reading 
of the foundational texts, and especially of the Qur’an, the 
teachings of Islam would appear manifestly in concord with 
the positions recommended by liberal rationalism.6 
 
Indeed, many of these modernist figures have expressed serious frustrations with 
the purported excesses of Sufism.  The major figures of this movement have often 
inveighed against the irrational tendencies of more popular Sufi practices, which are 
allegedly at odds with the rationalist aims of the modernist project to begin with.  For 
instance, the great Egyptian modernist intellectual Muḥammad ʿAbduh, despite his 
appreciation for Islamic mysticism more broadly, saw its purportedly corrupt excesses in 
nineteenth century Egypt as exacerbating irrationality and social malaise, and as 
introducing unacceptable innovations (bidʿah).7  Likewise, both ʿAbduh’s mentor, Jamāl 
al-Dīn al-Afghānī, and his protégée, Rashīd Riḍā, expressed similar condemnations 
against the irrationality of certain aspects of Sufi doctrine.8   
Still, this is not to suggest that Islamic Modernism was antithetical to Sufism tout 
court.  In fact, there exists a nineteenth-century Muslim thinker who, like ʿAbduh, 
                                                 
6 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), 7-8.  
 
7 Elizabeth Sirriyeh, Sufis and Anti-Sufis, 92. 
 
8 I should disclose here that all three figures I mention in this example are part of the broader Salafī 
reformist movement of the nineteenth century, and while they all indeed qualify as Islamic modernists, I 
am in no way trying to conflate Islamic modernism with Salafism specifically.  In other words, Salafism is 
but one trend within the broader movement of Islamic modernism.   
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Afghānī, and Riḍā, was wholly convinced that reason and rationality are fundamental to 
Islamic doctrine and incumbent on all Muslims, and who equally viewed the embrace of 
the natural sciences as fully compatible with Islamic beliefs and key to Muslim material 
advancement and progress—and who articulated these positions under specifically Sufi 
auspices.  Yet this figure—or, to be more specific, the reformist aspect of his career—is 
woefully neglected in the scholarly literature, in contradistinction to the voluminous 
studies done on ʿAbduh, Afghānī, Muḥammad Iqbāl of India, and other Muslim 
reformists in this vein.  This figure is the Amīr ʿAbd al Qādir al-Jazāʾirī, the famed 
Algerian anti-colonial resistance leader, known primarily for his lengthy military 
resistance campaign against French colonial forces in Algeria.  His career in Algeria 
aside, the Amīr is also acclaimed for his having protected and saved some ten thousand 
local Christians and European consuls from certain massacre in 1860, during his exile in 
Ottoman Damascus—a feat that won him the approbation of none other than American 
President Abraham Lincoln.   
 It is less well-known, however, that the Amīr ʿAbd al Qādir spent his post-
military career—that is, after his eventual surrender to the French in 1847—in  
formulating articulating, and ultimately teaching a deeply intricate vision of Islamic 
reform, one urging the embrace of reason, intellect, and the natural sciences as part and 
parcel of the Islamic tradition—indeed, some of the very same ingredients of reform 
proposed by Islamic modernists.  Moreover, he grounded the insights of his spiritual 
reform methodology on, of all sources, the theosophical mysticism of the great medieval 
mystic, al-Shaykh al-Akbar (The Greatest Master), Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī.  Yet despite 
these deep contributions ʿAbd al Qādir made to Islamic religious and spiritual reform 
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more generally, and to Islamic modernism more specifically, his case is woefully 
underrepresented in the scholarly literature.  Thus, in this thesis I hope to help correct the 
deficiency and neglect in the study of this fascinating nineteenth-century modernist 
reformist, by properly investigating his doctrinal and spiritual Weltanschauung 
 That said, reviewing the relevant literature revealed that a comprehensive analysis 
of the Amīr’s writings on Islamic reform would indeed be voluminous, and simply too 
burdensome to complete in the one-year period allotted for this Master’s thesis.  
Nonetheless, it turns out that the limited academic writings available on the reformist 
aspect of ʿAbd al Qādir’s career themselves make an excellent subject of study.  For 
students of the Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir as a figure of Islamic reformism, what can the 
existing historiographies on his person tell us about his reform methodology?   
 This thesis, then, can best be understood as a critical historiographical review of 
the spiritual reformist thought of the Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī, as presented in the 
existing scholarly literature on his person.  From this review, coupled with my own 
primary analysis of relevant sections of the Amīr’s spiritual writings, I hope to make 
better sense of his reformist impulses, and the spiritual worldview that came to inform 
them.  Chapters will be structured accordingly.  In Chapter one I will provide a 
comprehensive biographical narrative of ʿAbd al-Qādir, from his upbringing, to his career 
as a military resistance leader against the colonial French, to his eventual surrender and 
subsequent exile in Damascus for the remainder of his life.  Without this background, it 
would be exceedingly difficult to make meaningful sense of his writings, which I will 
address in the subsequent chapter.  In chapter two I discuss the Amīr’s three published 
books on Islamic reform, with a particular emphasis on his final and most substantive 
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volume, the Kitāb al-Mawāqif (Book of Stops), composed during his exile period in 
Ottoman Syria.  Here I will evaluate the depiction of ʿAbd al-Qādir in the eyes of his 
interpreters, as presented in the secondary scholarly literature.  In particular, I am 
interested here in the assertions they make about the influences for his reformist thought; 
as I discuss in detail in this chapter, existing literature seems to suggest that the Amīr’s 
reformist predilections are ultimately modeled on Western rationalism.  Accordingly, I 
attempt to evaluate the claims made in this regard, first from the arguments proposed in 
the historiographies themselves. 
 From here, I move on to scrutinize the religious though of the Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir 
in his own words.  Chapter three is thus a primary-text analysis—and translation when 
appropriate—of relevant sections of the Mawāqif, namely those consulted and analyzed 
by the historiographical literature.  In this (admittedly selective) primary source analysis, 
I hope to more fully test the veracity of the claims made about the Amīr’s spiritual 
reformist thought in the secondary literature, and in so doing open new vistas into his 
reformist methodology.  From here I will conclude in a fourth and final chapter, which 
summarizes the discoveries and insights made in the course of the study, and provides 
cogent theoretical implications for further study of the Amīr as an Islamic modernist 
reformer.   
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Chapter 1: Biography 
 Despite the fact that this thesis concerns itself primarily with the Amīr ʿAbd al-
Qādir al- Jazāʾirī’s career following his exile from Algeria, insofar as he only began 
articulating his thoughts on Islamic reform after the end of his military career, it would be 
impossible to make sense of that stage of his life—or of the religious treatises he 
authored during that period—without a foundational understanding of his background 
and role as an anti-colonial resistance leader in Algeria.  Accordingly, in this chapter I 
hope to provide a comprehensive biographical review of the Amīr’s life, starting with his 
career in Algeria—that is, until his surrender to the French in 1847.  For this synopsis I 
will be drawing mostly from Raphael Danziger’s excellent volume, Abd al-Qadir and the 
Algerians: Resistance to the French and Internal Consolidation. After providing this 
perfunctory review, I will briefly evaluate the role religious sentiment ostensibly played 
in his military campaign against the French—a question that, needless to say, is also of 
deeply salient when evaluating his theories of religious reform.  Finally, I will conclude 
with a survey of the remainder of his life in exile in Ottoman Syria, at which point his 
career as an Islamic modernist reformer fully came to fruition.   
 
Upbringing, and Temporary Exile 
 ʿAbd al-Qādir was born on September 26, 1807, in the village of Guetna, a small 
village in Western Algeria less than fifteen miles of Mascara.  Founded by his 
grandfather Muṣṭafa b. Muḥammad in 1971, Guetna emerged as an important center for 
the propagation of the Qādirī Ṣūfī order, which Mustafa joined in Baghdad en route to a 
pilgrimage to Mecca.  Following his return to Algeria, Mustafa successfully revived this 
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spiritual creed that had been all but extinct in Western Algeria, winning over a prominent 
and eminent constituency.  Guetna further developed and expanded at the hand of 
Mustafa’s son Muḥyī al-Dīn, who upon inheriting the order’s leadership augmented both 
its religious services, as well as its social and economic services.9  By the time ʿAbd al-
Qādir was born, Guetna had become a diverse hub for students, traveling scholars, 
travelers, and Qādirī adherents seeking to pay their respects.   
The ambience of Guetna proved instrumental for the future Amīr, not only for its 
cosmopolitan atmosphere, but because the income it produced provided ʿAbd al-Qādir 
with an independent financial source.  Moreover, the Qādirī Sufi order wound up 
providing him with an important constituency.  Merely being the son of the Qādirī chief 
of the whole of Algeria—a man whose renown as a spiritual leader and marabout came to 
transcend the borders of the Algerian frontier—meant a ready base of followers, and a 
solid basis for future legitimacy as a leader.  For, after all, “[h]e belonged to one of the 
most venerated families in the province of Oran.”10 
 It was in this unique ambience that the young ʿAbd al-Qādir was initially raised.  
Making full use of his privileged upbringing, he from an early age reaped the benefits of 
some of the finest educational opportunities available.  First tutored by his father in 
Guetna, he then continued his education under the qāḍī of the port town of Arzew, 
Ahmad b. Tahir, himself considered “one of the best-educated men in Algeria.”11  In 
additional to classical Islamic sciences, the qāḍī had acquired training in the natural 
                                                 
9 Raphael Danziger, Abd Al-Qadir and the Algerians: Resistance to the French and Internal Consolidation 
(New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1977), 53.   
 
10 Ibid., 54. 
 
11 Ibid., 54. 
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sciences from European seamen who had stopped at the port, particularly those relevant 
to navigation.  Accordingly, in addition to providing his pupil a classical Islamic 
education, he simultaneously trained the young ʿAbd al-Qādir in astronomy, 
mathematics, and geography.12  This early introduction to the scientific method and 
rational inquiry, upon which the aforementioned disciplines are founded, may have 
played a formative role in the Amīr’s later predilection for this mode of inquiry, as I will 
discuss in more detail in the next chapter.   
 From his studies with the qāḍī, ʿAbd al-Qādir was sent to Oran in 1821 to 
complete his studies, at an elite school composed of the most prominent families in the 
Oran province.  Here he had his first experience with what was to become one of his key 
adversaries throughout the course of his career: the Ottoman regency.  The Ottoman 
administrators governing Algeria were functionally detached from Algerian society, 
refusing to mingle or integrate into it, while contributing little to development in the 
country, or to the well-being of the Algerian people more broadly. Instead, the Ottoman 
establishment’s relationship with the Algerians was primarily one of demanding 
excessive taxes, and of swiftly and forcefully punishing those who refused to comply.13  
The young ʿAbd al-Qādir’s first experience with the Ottomans, during his stay in Oran, 
seem to have developed a deep resentment for them, which was to influence him for 
years to come.14 
 His resentment for his Ottoman stewards intensified, moreover, after his father 
Muḥyī al-Dīn and several other prominent marabouts attempted to intervene with the 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 54-55. 
 
13 Ibid., 15-16. 
 
14 Ibid., 55. 
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Turkish authorities on behalf of financially overburdened tribes, seeking a reduction in 
their tax liabilities in light of an onerous famine and plague in Oran in the early 1820s.  In 
response, Hasan, the bey of Oran, had several of them executed.15  Fearing the worst, 
Muḥyī al-Dīn attempted to temporarily leave Algeria by taking a hajj pilgrimage, taking 
his son along.  But this did not go over well with Hasan bey, who, fearing a rebellion 
disguised as a pilgrimage caravan, had Muḥyī al-Dīn and his son apprehended, and 
placed under house arrest in Oran for two years; following their release, they were 
ordered to leave the country immediately.  No doubt, this likely deepened ʿAbd al-
Qādir’s animosity toward the Ottomans and their regime.16  But in leaving his homeland, 
and in spending two years abroad—largely under the auspices of the hajj pilgrimage—
ʿAbd al-Qādir will have returned to Algeria having undergone a series of transformative 
experiences.  Informed by these new sensibilities from his travels, he both gained the 
necessary insight to lead an effective resistance campaign against the French, and a 
prominent status among the people of the Oran province that were critical in bolstering 
his credibility as a military and political leader, as we shall see shortly.   
 
Hajj Sojourn 
Following their release from house arrest by the Turkish administration, in 1826 
ʿAbd al-Qādir and his father left Algeria on a hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, allegedly 
financed in part by the bey himself.17  Arriving first in Tunis, this was the future Amīr’s 
first encounter with a Muslim tradition that was more highly developed than what he had 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
 
16 Ibid., 56.  
 
17 Ibid., 56. 
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known in Algeria; after all, [t]here was nothing in his country that approached the 
Zaytuna mosque as a center for Islamic studies.”18  This journey, then, broadened his 
cosmopolitan sensibilities beyond the confines of Algeria, which despite the relatively 
pluralistic outlook of his upbringing in Guetna, as outlined earlier, nonetheless could not 
offer the diversity—or the company—he was to experience while abroad.   
From there they visited Alexandria and Cairo, and after a month’s stay in Mecca 
for completion of the hajj rites, they spent some months in Damascus and then Baghdad.  
Following three months in Baghdad, they performed another hajj pilgrimage, before 
finally returning to Algeria by way of Egypt and Tunis.19 At each stage of the journey, as 
I outline in more detail below, ʿAbd al-Qādir continued and augmented his religious 
education and training, working with the preeminent scholars and institutions each 
country had to offer.  Additionally, he met some distinguished personalities throughout 
this expedition, many of whom left an indelible mark on his thought process that was to 
last well into his revolutionary career as leader of the Algerian resistance against the 
French, and even beyond.  
In Egypt, as elsewhere in his journey, ʿAbd al-Qādir took full advantage of the 
opportunities availed to him by that country to deepen his knowledge base, both of 
Islamic religious doctrine, and of statecraft.  With respect to the former, he enrolled in the 
renowned Egyptian Islamic university al-Azhar during his second visit to Egypt, studying 
under the distinguished ʿulamāʾ affiliated with that seminary.20  But his experience in 
Egypt was especially illuminating with respect to the latter, for here he had his first 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
 
19 Ibid., 56-58.  
 
20 Ibid., 58. 
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experience with the administrative, economic, and political restructuring of society 
undertaken by famed Egyptian reformer Muḥammad ʿAlī.  As he later enthusiastically 
mentioned to French officers, the young Amīr was immediately taken by ʿAlī’s 
administrative methods, policies, and reforms, and came to see them as a model for 
effective governance.  Indeed, ʿAbd al-Qādir and his father were said to have had a 
private audience with the Egyptian reformer, whose example had a formative impact on 
the way he structured his own quasi-state in Algeria.21   
 Upon reaching Mecca to perform the hajj pilgrimage, ʿAbd al-Qādir crossed paths 
with another famed reformer in his own right, this one a fellow Algerian: Muḥammad ibn 
ʿAli al-Sanūsī, founder of the Sanūsī Sufi order that presently predominates in Libya and 
parts of Sudan.  I will not provide here an exhaustive background of al-Sanūsī or his 
order, but for now will briefly mention that the Sanūsī movement is known in particular 
for its role in resisting the incursions of European colonialism, and in decrying the more 
doctrinaire placations to tradition (taqlīd) it felt were characteristic of the Muslim 
ʿulamāʾ at the time.22  From his meeting with al-Sanūsī, it seems that these dual 
tendencies may have left a lasting impact on ʿAbd al-Qādir, both as a resistance leader 
and as a religious intellectual.   
According to one account, ʿAbd al-Qādir and his father were invited to al-
Sanūsī’s zāwiya in Abū Qubays, where they were served a meal of couscous—a reprieve 
from the temporary exile from their native Algeria, being offered a traditional dish from 
the Maghreb while in a faraway land.  Here, after the young Amīr ate fourteen mouthfuls 
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22 For a more detailed account of al-Sanūsī and his order, see Knut S Vikør, Sufi and Scholar on the Desert 
Edge: Muḥammad b. ʿAlī Al-Sanūsī and His Brotherhood (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 
1995). 
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of the semolina pearls, refusing to eat more despite his host’s encouragement that doing 
so will strengthen him, al-Sanūsī remarked to ʿAbd al-Qādir’s father that the youngster 
was prescribed by God to fulfill a profound role in his life, both for his homeland and for 
the Muslim umma more broadly.  More specifically, he remarks: 
The religion of Islam requires every Muslim to defend it, as 
far as he is able to, and forbids the Muslim to surrender to 
the enemy.  I say to you that I have the best wishes for our 
son ʿAbd al-Qādir, indeed he is of those who are going to 
make the sacred lands of Islam expand and raise the banner 
of jihad.23 
 
This meeting was, the account suggests, the reason ʿAbd al-Qādir and his father 
conceived the idea of revolt against the French imperialists in Algeria three years later.24 
That said, as Vikør astutely points out, there is some uncertainty as to whether the 
source in question is wholly accurate; though he does not dispute that the meeting 
between ʿAbd al-Qādir and al-Sanūsī likely took place, Vikør argues that the specifics of 
the story outlined above may have been exaggerated.25  As such, veering on the side of 
caution, I am refraining from positing that al-Sanūsī’s ideas, towards anti-colonial 
resistance or towards Islamic reform, unquestionably came to inform the future Amīr’s 
thought process.  But from what studies like Vikør’s suggest, there is enough evidence to 
consider the possibility, and to explore the matter further—though the latter is beyond the 
scope of this study. 
 Then, upon arrival in Syria, ʿAbd al-Qādir further continued his religious training, 
attending lectures on the Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī collection of Prophetic aḥadīth at the 
                                                 
23 Knut S Vikør, Sufi and Scholar on the Desert Edge: Muḥammad b. ʿAlī Al-Sanūsī and His Brotherhood 
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1995), 126. 
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Umayyad Mosque in Damascus.  But more importantly, he and his father had the 
opportunity to meet and study with the Sufi leader Shaykh Khālid of the Naqshbandīyya-
Mujaddīyya order.26  Extremely active in spreading his reformist spiritual thought 
throughout the Ottoman Empire, Shaykh Khālid was deeply involved in generating a 
religious awakening in Damascus at the time of ʿAbd al-Qādir’s arrival.  During their 
stay, Khālid welcomed ʿAbd al-Qādir and his father into the Naqshbandīyya way, 
deferring their stewardship to one of his deputies, Muḥammad al-Khānī.  The two 
Algerian wayfarers then spent the next four months in the Naqshbandī-run Murādiyya 
mosque, where it is possible that they took hand (bayʿah) with the Naqshbandīyya—
though this was likely more a gesture of goodwill and blessing than of exclusive 
allegiance to that order.27  Nonetheless, irrespective of whether or not he formally joined 
the Naqshbandīyya, this meeting with Shaykh Khālid, and the exposure to his religious 
revivalism, came to play a formative role in the Amīr’s career as a religious reformer 
himself during his exile in Damascus.  I will elaborate on this influence further toward 
the end of this chapter. 
 Finally, before returning to Algeria, ʿAbd al-Qādir and his father visited Baghdad, 
where they paid their respects at the tomb of ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jilānī, one of the foremost 
Sūfī saints in Islam, and, as the founder and patriarch of the Qādirī ṣūfī order, the 
progenitor of the two men’s spiritual legacy.  During their three-month stay, father and 
son renewed their ties to the Qādirī order, and in turn received formal ijāzah from the 
                                                 
26 For an excellent overview of Shaykh Khālid’s spiritual doctrine, and its spread throughout the Ottoman 
lands in the 19th century, see Butrus Abu-Manneh, “The Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in the Ottoman 
Lands in the Early 19th Century,” Die Welt Des Islams 22, no. 1 (1982): 1-36.  
 
27 Itzchak Weismann, Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus 
(Leiden: Brill, 2001), 149. 
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order’s then-chief, Shaykh Maḥmūd al-Qādirī.28  More importantly, this numinous 
meeting with the esteemed walī provided precisely the atmosphere necessary for the 
promulgation of legendary tales depicting ʿAbd al-Qādir as an anointed leader, 
sanctioned by none other than Sayyid ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jilānī himself.  These 
foundational myths predicting the ascendancy of ʿAbd al-Qādir as leader of the 
Algerians—spread in large part by his father—proved instrumental in establishing his 
legitimacy among the people of Algeria.29  Indeed, upon returning to Algeria in 1828, 
Muḥyī al-Dīn and his son were greeted as heroes, and had acquired a prominent 
following throughout the Oran province and beyond.30   
Fearing that this newly found popularity would lead to more harassment by the 
loathed Turkish authorities, Muḥyī al-Dīn and his son spent the next two years abstaining 
from public life, devoting themselves to study and to solitary spiritual meditation.  As 
they intended, this temporary isolation appeased the Ottomans, but also elevated their 
standing in Algerian society by increasing their reputation for spiritual devotion.31  
Following this spiritual sojourn, the two men resurfaced to witness the commencement of 
a military occupation that would come to engulf their country for the next 132 years.  
 
French Occupation of Algiers, and the Emergence of an Amīr 
 On July 5, 1830, the French entered the city of Algiers victoriously, securing the 
surrender of the city from the Turkish authorities, thereby ending over 300 years of 
                                                 
28 Raphael Danziger, Abd Al-Qadir and the Algerians, 56-57. 
 
29 Ibid., 57.  
 
30 Ibid., 58. 
 
31 Ibid.  
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Ottoman rule.  Initially, French presence was met with little resistance from Algerian 
tribes in the interior, no doubt in part due to their animosity for the Turkish 
administration the French quickly overthrew, and in part due to the French presence 
being limited to the countryside.  But with the collapse of the Turkish regime came the 
halting of all taxation.  And with the sudden disappearance of centuries-old tax 
obligations, and of whatever law and order offered by the Turkish administration, Algeria 
quickly descended into anarchy, which quickly spread to the Oran province: overtaxed 
tribes sought out revenge against the collaborationist makhzan tribes, old tribal blood 
feuds resurfaced, rampant pillaging and  extortion became the norm, and public safely all 
but disappeared.  Unsurprisingly, economic activity in Oran came to a standstill.32   
 Growing weary of the anarchy engulfing the province, the tribes of Oran sought 
reprieve in an unlikely ally: ʿAbd al-Rahman, the sultan of neighboring Morocco.  
Despite his original reticence, the sultan ʿAbd al-Rahman eventually complied, and in 
October 1830 facilitated the transfer of some 500 Moroccan soldiers on the Algerian 
frontier.  The sultan was no doubt motivated in part by his long-standing desire to expand 
Moroccan presence into western Algeria.  But more importantly, ʿAbd al-Rahman agreed 
to intervene in large part to curtail the threat posed by a Western European power in his 
immediate vicinity; collapse of Ottoman rule in Oran, he astutely realized, would 
possibly lead to a power vacuum that would be filled by the French.33  It seems, then, that 
ʿAbd al-Rahman was motivated in large part by a desire to contain the French, lest they 
make additional gains in Algeria, or even worse, extend their colonial reach to the 
Moroccan borders.   
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From the outset, the Moroccan intervention campaign in Algeria was 
categorically anti-French in character, and sought to inculcate in the Algerian tribesmen a 
visceral desire to resist the French army’s imperialist incursions.  This was not a 
straightforward task, though, as French military presence on the Algerian coastline was 
by itself not sufficient to instill the desired sense of enmity toward the invading army.  
For ʿAbd al-Rahman to spearhead a successful resistance movement, as Danziger points 
out, he had to rally the disparate tribes behind a common cause: “What Mulay ʿAli found 
when he entered Oran province were numerous tribes fighting each other, quite oblivious 
to the French on their shores.  Abd al-Rahman intended to channel this wasted energy 
into a movement rallied behind Morocco in a unified struggle against France.”34 
Ultimately, the Moroccan sultan decided to anchor his movement in the language 
of religion.  Evoking religious propaganda portraying the French not simply as colonial 
invaders, but as members of an infidel army seeking to do harm to the believers, ʿAbd al-
Rahman called on the inhabitants of the Algerian interior to subdue the infidel advances 
through a noble and virtuous jihād.  While we cannot say with certainty why the sultan 
selected Islam and military jihād as the unifying banner of his movement, it is 
nonetheless clear that his decision proved quite judicious.  Exhorting Muslim unity 
against French infidels, it turned out, appealed to a wider audience, and helped overcome 
the partisan disputes between competing Algerian tribes.  Moreover, it successfully 
planted a sentiment of resistance to the French that would endure long after Moroccan 
forces left the Algerian shores.   
                                                 
34 Ibid., 43. 
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Indeed, Muḥyī al-Dīn himself, whose attitude toward the French invading the 
Algerian coast initially came across as ambivalent,35 seems to have been ultimately won 
over by the anti-French revolutionary convictions espoused by the Moroccans.  Initially 
resisting pleas made by tribesmen that he militarily restore stability on his own, Muḥyī 
al-Dīn instead urged the Algerian notables to appeal to the Sultan of Morocco for 
assistance, ultimately granting his assent to the Moroccan occupation of Oran.  And after 
Moroccan intervention commenced, Muḥyī al-Dīn grew increasingly convinced of the 
need to actively resist French advances.36  The revolutionary spirit espoused by the 
Moroccans came to define his attitude toward the French moving forward, such that when 
the Moroccan forces withdrew from Oran—in 1831, and again in 1832—ushering in a 
return to anarchy, Muḥyī al-Dīn now willingly accepted the role of leader of a jihād 
campaign against the French.  In this role he led several military campaigns against the 
French, exhorting his troops to fulfill their duty of jihād by attacking French infidel 
forces.  Demonstrating to his constituency that his campaigns constituted a legitimate 
jihād, he went so far as inviting the infidel Frenchmen to Islam prior to attacking them.37  
And though these jihād campaigns did little damage to French forces, while incurring 
heavy Algerian casualties, they were nonetheless essential in solidifying and perpetuating 
the spirit of anti-colonial resistance.  As Danzinger points out, Muḥyī al-Dīn’s jihād 
“established a strong link between the fight against France and the consolidation of the 
internal factions.  Jihad enabled the two warring factions to resolve their differences and 
                                                 
35 Ibid., 59.  During the initial invasion, with the French still confined to the Algerian coastline, there are no 
reports of Muḥyī al-Dīn making any anti-French overtures.  Muḥyī al-Dīn was primarily interested in 
subduing the Ottomans, and arguably saw the French invasion as conducive to that end goal.   
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37 Ibid., 61-62. 
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unite in a common cause, while the attack on the French, with its inevitable losses, 
perpetuated itself through the spirit of vendetta.”38   
Equally important, Muḥyī al-Dīn’s jihād campaigns were instrumental in 
legitimizing his son as his successor.  With Muḥyī al-Dīn being too enfeebled due to old 
age to personally participate in active combat, he instead deferred to the young ʿAbd al-
Qādir to lead the attacks against the French.  This experience afforded the young man the 
opportunity to demonstrate extraordinary courage on the battlefield, and to exhibit his 
outstanding skills as a military leader and fighter.  As ʿAbd al-Qādir already had a 
reputation for piety, wisdom, and spiritual knowledge, acquiring the reputation of being a 
brave soldier was the last necessary step in legitimizing his rightful place as leader of the 
Algerian resistance.39 
And so, on November 22, 1832, a large assembly of notables representing three 
powerful Oran tribes gathered on the plain of Eghris, near Mascara, to pay homage to 
their new leader.  ʿAbd al-Qādir, then twenty-five years of age, was seated under a large 
elm tree, upon which his father approached the tree, and loudly pledged allegiance and 
submission to his son.  The other notables of the congregation then followed suit, each 
pledging loyalty to the young man while he remained seated under the all-encompassing 
elm—a gesture clearly designed to mimic the pledge of allegiance to the prophet 
Muḥammad taken by his followers at Hudaybiya in 627/8 A.D.40  Once the ceremony had 
concluded, ʿAbd al-Qādir was finally proclaimed Amīr al-Muʾminīn, Commander of the 
Faithful.  And thus began his fifteen-year career as anti-colonial resistance leader.  
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The Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir: Algerian Revolutionary 
 
Upon his accession to leadership, ʿAbd al-Qādir immediately sought to expand 
the scope of resistance to the French.  Like his father, he recognized the inextricable link 
between the fight against France and internal consolidation of Algerian tribesmen.  But 
unlike his father, he gave up on direct frontal jihād campaigns against French troops at 
the outset, and instead made his first priority extending his rule within the Algerian 
interior.  His support from a mere three seminomadic tribes, after all, while promising, 
would be insufficient to fully take on a European imperial power.  An aspiring new leader 
seeking acceptance among a disparate and disjointed constituency, he would need to 
placate the cultural, social, and religious context of Algerian tribal society to fully 
establish his legitimacy.   
As we have seen several times in the Amīr’s rise to power, the message of Islam 
had proven quite useful in garnering local support.  In the Algerian context, it is worth 
recalling that the religious milieu is deeply colored by mystical tendencies, with an active 
cult of saint worship having been firmly established in the region for several centuries.41  
Prior to assuming power, ʿAbd al-Qādir cemented his legitimacy as the future Amīr under 
precisely these auspices, deferring to the language of mysticism to appeal to his country’s 
Sufi predilections. As mentioned previously, his visit to Baghdad while in exile was 
monumental because the spiritual climate of paying respects to ʿAbd al-Qādir Jilāni 
proved fertile for establishing foundational myths of ʿAbd al-Qādir’s anointed status as 
Amīr al-Muʾminīn.  These legends, imbued with spiritual significance, suggested that 
ʿAbd al-Qādir Jilāni himself had selected the young man as a divinely sanctioned leader.  
Thus, with the profundity of ʿAbd al-Qādir’s spiritual presence and baraka so readily 
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apparent, the tribal chiefs and marabouts of Oran were ultimately convinced that he was 
the man Allah selected to lead them.42 
But following his ascendancy to power, he consolidated his legitimacy largely 
through appealing to Islamic exoteric ritual practice.43  Within days of assuming 
leadership, he seized control of the centrally-located town of Mascara; upon establishing 
his base and setting up an administrative government there, he sent circulars to the chiefs 
of all the tribes in the Oran province, demanding their submission to his authority as 
leader of the jihād against the French.  Purporting to follow in the footsteps of the Islamic 
caliphs, the Amīr stressed his role as unifier of the Muslim umma by commanding the 
noble jihād against the infidel invaders.  Still, though a critical mass of tribal leaders did 
indeed head to Mascara and pledge allegiance to ʿAbd al-Qādir shortly after receiving his 
initial appeal, the major tribal leaders in the Oran province flatly rejected his leadership.44 
 To overcome these obstacles, he continued to underscore his Islamic credentials 
to the Algerian interior, reiterating his commitment to uniting the Muslim umma and 
properly implementing the sharīʿah, under the banner of jihād.  And insofar as his 
opposition was largely provincial and self-serving in its outlook, this clarion call earned 
him a significant constituency:  
For it was this [his role as jihad leader] which gave him the 
greatest advantage over his rivals, all of whom appeared to 
be merely attempting to advance their own ambitions.  Abd 
al-Qadir, therefore, did not miss a chance to preach the 
strict observance of the Shariʿa.  On every occasion he 
quoted passages from the Qurʿān, calling for jihad.  In his 
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letters to the tribal chiefs and other leaders, he stressed his 
role as the unifier of the Muslims of all races and as the 
leader of jihad.45 
 
Of course simply paying lip service to his caliphal role was insufficient to grant him full 
legitimacy.  To prove his sincerity as a mujāhid, he decided to launch an attack against 
the infidels of Oran, albeit not through a direct military offensive.  Recalling his father’s 
repeated failures on that front, he instead laid siege to Oran.  First prohibiting the sale of 
horses, a precious military commodity to French forces, he went on to issue a 
proclamation forbidding the supply of any foodstuffs to the French, on penalty of 
hanging.  Furthermore, he continued to strengthen his position through his association 
with the Qādirī Sufi order.  To overcome the objections of the several disparate (and 
often mutually hostile) orders operating in Oran, ʿAbd al-Qādir astutely expanded the 
reach of his own order—establishing Qādirī centers in towns, villages, and tribes 
throughout the province—with each center propagating the need to follow ʿAbd al-Qādir 
as anointed leader of the jihād.46 
 In time these measures won him the support he clamored for, with tribe after tribe 
offering their allegiance to him.  By 1833, nearly every tribe in the Oran province had 
submitted to ʿAbd al-Qādir’s authority.  With an established and unified base of 
supporters, and a viable administrative system in place—the details of which I will 
provide shortly—the Amīr was now in a position to commence offensive jihād against 
the infidel Frenchmen.  Through 1832 and 1833 the Amīr launched several successful 
attacks against the French, prompting them in 1834 to negotiate a truce in the Desmichels 
treaty, which recognized ʿAbd al-Qādir as the sovereign leader of the majority of Oran 
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province, and granted him significant economic and trade concessions in the province.  
The Amīr took full advantage of these concessions, declaring to the tribes of the province 
that they constituted French fealty and submission to his authority, which emboldened 
him to further consolidate and expand his rule of the Algerian interior.47   
By 1837, hostilities resumed between the French and ʿAbd al-Qādir’s Algerian 
quasi-state, prompting the negotiation of a second truce, in the Tafna treaty.  Here, in 
exchange for several trade concessions, and for recognizing French sovereignty 
explicitly, he was granted the supply of French arms and ammunitions and, more 
importantly, French recognition of his rule over nearly two thirds of Algeria.48  As he did 
with the Desmichels treaty, the Amīr successfully downplayed the concessions he had 
made to the French, and presented the Tafna treaty to his constituency as another 
testament to his exalted status over the subdued French infidels.49  Moreover, shortly 
after concluding the Tafna treaty, ʿAbd al-Qādir gained even more leadership currency, 
again conferred through the veneer of Islamic authenticity.  More specifically, he 
received a fatwa from the esteemed ʿulamāʾ of Fes, which he had requested prior to the 
start of peace negotiations.  This document provided him with legitimacy from a religious 
body unanimously accepted in Algeria as binding, and endowed him with all-expansive 
(and Islamically sanctioned) powers:  
It authorized the imam (meaning Abd al-Qadir) to fight 
those engaged in an insurrection against his authority; it 
ordered him to punish spies, impostors, violators of the 
Shariʿa, and other criminals, as well as those aiding and 
abetting them; it prohibited the sale of strategic materials 
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such as arms and copper to the Christians except during a 
truce; it authorized the imam to punish those refusing to 
obey the call for jihad; it ordered him to fight those 
refusing to pay the zakat; it authorized him to make  peace 
with the infidels if this was required for the survival of the 
Muslims and their country.50 
 
Now the Amīr was in a better position than ever to unify the disparate tribes of 
Algeria under his leadership, and buttress the reach of his authority.  And indeed he did: 
by 1839, ʿAbd al-Qādir’s sphere of control had extended to central Algeria, and his 
control of the country had reached its zenith.  
Unfortunately for the Amīr, though, the tides were about to turn.  Toward the end 
of 1839, hostilities between ʿAbd al-Qādir and the French began to resume; shortly 
thereafter, in December of 1840, Governor General Valee was recalled to France, and 
replaced with General Thomas Robert Bugeaud—the same general who signed the Tafna 
treaty.  No longer interested in merely containing ʿAbd al-Qādir, Bugeaud adopted a 
“scorched earth,” policy, with the goal of the Amīr’s complete and total defeat.  
Following a long struggle over the next several years, in which ʿAbd al-Qādir temporarily 
sought refuge in Morocco—which in turn help spearhead the Franco-Moroccan war of 
1844—the French finally got their wish: on December 21, 1847, after spending over a 
decade transforming a local movement of inconspicuous auspices into a semi-
autonomous state encompassing over two thirds of Algeria, the Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir al-
Jazāʾirī declared his formal surrender.51 
From this section, it is clear that ʿAbd al-Qādir’s understanding of statecraft was 
one deeply couched in an Islamic framework.  Placating the religious sensibilities of 
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Algerian tribesmen played a pivotal role in his ascendancy to leadership, and upon taking 
up the mantle of Amīr al-Muʾminīn, underscoring his commitment to waging a 
religiously-sanctioned jihad against infidel French imperialists was central to his ability 
to consolidate and expand his rule.  To unify a deeply divided tribal society, the Amīr 
astutely recognized the need to rally them behind a common cause. In this context, Islam 
proved quite effective as a clarion call to overcome Algerian factionalism.   
Indeed, even on an administrative level, one can argue that the Amīr governed his 
indigenous quasi-state under distinctly Islamic auspices, for he went through great 
lengths to implement and enforce a particularly strict interpretation of sharīʿah 
legislation.  As noted above, he implemented laws punishing those refusing to obey the 
call for jihād, and by extension those refusing to pay zakat, without which the jihād 
campaign would have been financially compromised.  As for conducting the jihād itself, 
he did not limit himself to direct military offensives, but also resorted to laying siege to 
the infidel army, forbidding his constituency to sell Christians strategic supplies, or, as 
we’ve seen in the early stages of his leadership, foodstuffs, under penalty of hanging. 
Even on private legal matters, he administered justice based on a narrow 
interpretation of Islamic law, such that purported vices like wine, gambling, and smoking 
were outlawed, prayer was made mandatory, and detractors were subject to corporal 
punishment:  
Whoever was caught at his shop during prayer-time was 
liable to flogging, and special wardens were appointed to 
watch over the application of this rule.  Women were not 
permitted to enter mosques, and the doorkeepers were 
enjoined to mark with ochre any woman contravening this 
20 
 
regulation.  Women of doubtful morals were forced to 
marry.52 
 
The question then becomes, was the Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir a theocrat, or motivated 
primarily by the establishment of theocratic Islamic rule in Algeria?  Several 
commentators, like Israeli scholar Pessah Shinar, advocate this position, suggesting “[t]he 
state he set about to organize, though currently referred to as a sultanate, was conceived 
by him as a theocracy, patterned after the Medinese umma of Muḥammad and his 
immediate successors.”53  ʿAbd al-Qādir, Shinar continues, should not be considered an 
Algerian nationalist, but a proponent of an Islamic state—a state which, Shinar continues, 
is staunchly unaccommodating of non-Muslims.   
How, then, does one accurately interpret this stage of the Amīr’s career?  Would it 
be more accurate to consider him the founder of the modern Algerian nation-state, or 
would it be more appropriate to consider him a figure motivated entirely by his religious 
convictions?  In short, was ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī a nationalist (or a proto-nationalist), 
or a theocrat?  Certainly, this question becomes increasingly salient in the context of 
ʿAbd al-Qādir’s role as a religious reformist later in his life, so it is worth treating in 
some detail before proceeding to the rest of the Amīr’s biography.   
 
ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī: Nationalist, or Theocrat? 
 Opponents of the claim that ʿAbd al-Qādir’s movement was a nationalist one in 
its auspices are quick to point out that the Amīr does not make specific reference to 
Algerian statehood or peoplehood.  Indeed, in his recorded addresses and 
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correspondences, he typically refers to the inhabitants of his quasi-state as ‘Muslims’ or 
‘Arabs,’ but never as ‘Algerians,’ in the territorial sense of the term.  Nor does he refer to 
the territory under his jurisdiction as ‘Algeria,’ despite the term having been used by 
Europeans long before its official adoption in 1839.54  Furthermore, despite his own 
distinctly Arab heritage, the Amīr shows no palpable concern with Arab identity as such; 
in his bid for leadership, he sought allies just as often among Oran’s Berber tribes as 
among its Arab ones, often placing them in key leadership positions in his 
administration.55  With the idea of an Algerian Arab nation-state ostensibly absent from 
his conception of statecraft, this argument continues, ʿAbd al-Qādir cannot legitimately 
be considered a nationalist, in the modern sense of the term.  Rather, proponents of this 
position contend, his goal was “to weld both Arabs and Berbers of the former Beylik into 
a strictly orthodox Islamic commonwealth through the agency of jihad.”56 
 As preface, it is worth pointing out that the idea of the modern Arab nation-state 
had not been fully cemented in the Arab world until the twentieth century.  Accordingly, 
it might be somewhat anachronistic to expect a mid-nineteenth-century Arab anti-colonial 
leader to specifically ground his message of resistance in the language of territorial 
statehood.57  It would be a more fruitful exercise, in my view, to analyze the inner 
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workings and organization of the Amīr’s nascent state.  Did his internal policies reflect a 
commitment to an Islamic caliphate, to a proto-Algerian republic, or to some other 
political entity altogether?   
 I will begin by analyzing the makeup of the state administration.  As Shinar points 
out, ʿAbd al-Qādir claimed to have expunged his administration of prior loyalists to the 
Ottoman regime, and to have replaced them with marabouts and sharifs.  Lower officials, 
similarly, were selected primarily based on their religious devotion, and were sworn into 
office on the Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī book of hadith.  Several of his religious appointees proved 
inexperienced and inefficient civil servants, but nonetheless, Shinar argues, “what seems 
to have affected him even more deeply was that some people he appointed to responsible 
posts for political reasons 'trod with both feet upon religion.'”58   
 But as Danziger points out, a closer analysis of the list of ʿAbd al-Qādir’s aides 
suggests his claims to have selected his administration by their religiosity to have been 
overblown.  In fact, the Amīr proved perfectly willing to employ civil servants who 
previously served under the Turks, provided that they were competent and experienced.   
Following the Desmichels Treaty, he established a new and critically important position 
in his administration, that of consul; in his selection of consuls, he demonstrates his 
loyalties lay not with the appointee’s religious status, but with the value the appointee 
stood to provide to his nascent state.  His first appointee, in fact, was a French-educated 
Algerian Jew, Juda Ben Dran, whose status as the scion of a family of rabbis that had 
been prominent in the Algerian Jewish community for centuries made him a valued asset.  
Subsequent appointees to his consul position, moreover, were similarly appointed based 
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on how well their family ties and personal character stood to serve the needs of the 
administration.  It seems, then, that “Abd al-Qadir continued to select his top personnel 
more on the basis of merit than of marabout status.”59   
 We see a similar phenomenon in ʿAbd al-Qadir’s application of Islamic legal 
codes.  True, the Amīr did often make reference in his statements to running his state as 
an Islamic republic governed by the sharīʿah, and indeed implemented personal status 
laws based on Qurʿānic principles, by criminalizing the consumption of alcohol, 
smoking, and abstention from prayer.  But were such measures based entirely on 
doctrinaire religious convictions, part of a broader campaign “aimed at the moral 
regeneration of his people by bringing it back to the simple and healthy ways of the early 
Muslims, salaf, and the spirit of the Qurʿān, in a fashion reminiscent of Wahhābism”?60  
In point of fact, these harsh Qurʿānic punishments were not wholly pervasive and all-
inclusive, as religious judges (quḍāh, sing. qādī) were granted jurisdiction only over 
private offenses.  Matters pertaining to the state and public affairs, on the other hand, 
were under the jurisdiction of state administrators, who did not rule according to the 
sharīʿah, but according to a secular legal code (qawānīn) based on custom and current 
legal practice.  “Even in affairs normally considered to be under the jurisdiction of the 
qadi, state officials were able to assume judgment from them.”61  It seems, then, that the 
Amīr’s commitment to sharīʿah in his nascent state wasn’t without its caveats.  
 This selective reading of the Amīr’s administration and rule can perhaps be best 
seen in his attitude towards his Christian adversaries.  As Shinar points out, the Amīr’s 
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rhetoric was often quite adversarial towards Christians, viewing them as infidels and 
sworn enemies of Allah and his religion, and of the establishment of an Islamic state.  To 
use a somewhat sensational example, in the presence of a Christian ʿAbd al-Qādir once 
allegedly lowered his gaze and contracted his features, so as to avoid defilement.62  But 
as Danziger points out, these stories were likely exaggerated, and belie the more 
established track record of the Amīr’s personal experiences with Christians.  In dealing 
with Christian prisoners in his captivity, the Amīr proved relaxed and amiable, often 
tending to their material needs quite jovially.63  It seems, then, that the Amīr’s public 
attitude towards the Christian infidels, as articulated in his animosity-laden public 
statements, was not wholly congruent with his personal attitude towards Christians in 
point of fact, which seemed more tame by comparison.   
 Why the gap between the Amīr’s public and private personas, then?  Why the 
apparent inconsistencies between the Amīr’s public proclamations, espousing Islam as 
the basis of his statecraft and inner thought process, on the one hand, and his personal 
conduct in point of actual fact on the other hand?  As Danziger points out, this was a 
critical strategy on the Amīr’s part, to invoke Islam as part of a larger campaign to 
advance the needs of the state.  This is not to suggest that the Amīr was not pious or 
religious on a personal level; we have every reason to believe that he was a devout 
believer.  But his invocation of Islam as a statesman was driven less by inflexible 
religious convictions than by the astute realization that doing so would be crucial to 
providing his campaign legitimacy.  “In other words,” as Danziger points out (emphases 
mine), “the amir's pious concern for his Muslim brethren subjected to Christian 
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occupation was expressed only as long as it was politically expedient.  It always took 
second place to pragmatic considerations of state. Indeed, it is in pragmatism, rather than 
the inflexible observance of Islam, that the key to Abd al-Qadir's political conduct lies.”64  
 What does this all mean, though, for the question being posed?  Was the Amīr 
ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī a theocrat, or a nationalist?  As we have seen, the Amīr’s use of 
Islam in the public sphere was limited in its scope, and was driven more by pragmatism 
than by dogmatism.  Given as much, I don’t think it accurate to characterize him as a 
“theocrat,” in the strictest sense of the term.  But on the other hand, irrespective of 
whatever pragmatic concerns he had in mind, the fact remains that he did in fact make 
use of Islam as part of the state apparatus.  As such, despite the caveats we discussed, it 
would not be inaccurate to conclude that the Amīr was partly influenced by theocratic 
concerns.  As for nationalism, as we have discussed previously, he made no specific 
public overtures towards leading a nationalist cause, territorial or otherwise.  But 
nonetheless, his efforts were clearly directed at solidifying the rule of the entirety of the 
Algerian terrain against French invaders, two thirds of which he came to command in his 
heyday.  His primary concern, it seems, was sovereignty of his homeland, now under the 
threat of invasion by foreign infidels.  As such, despite the absence of public statements 
espousing nationalist ambitions on behalf of “Algeria” specifically, his clamoring for the 
sovereignty of his nascent state certainly reflects a nationalist sentiment.   
 In short, it is oversimplified to clearly rubber-stamp the Amīr with either of these 
two labels, as they are not mutually exclusive.  In my view, it would be more accurate to 
describe him as: an anti-colonial resistance leader motivated by nationalist concerns, 
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who, in the name of pragmatism and political expediency, largely grounded his 
movement in the language of religion.   
 With that said, it seems that there is a tendency for historical accounts of this 
figure to conceive him in unequivocal terms, despite the multiplicity of his persona that 
we have seen throughout this analysis.  This tendency, it turns out, is not new, but has 
been evident in accounts of the Amīr since the 1830s.  As we shall see in the next section, 
these narratives often contorted the person of the Amīr as part of a jockeying for 
influence among competing imperial powers.  
 
ʿAbd al-Qādir as a Symbol 
 
Lui, l'homme fauve du désert, 
 
Lui, le sultan né sous les palmes, 
Le compagnon des lions roux, 
Le hadji farouche aux yeux calmes, 
L'émir pensif, féroce et doux ; 
 
Lui, sombre et fatal personnage 
Qui, spectre pâle au blanc burnous, 
Bondissait, ivre de carnage, 
Puis tombait dans l'ombre à genoux; 
 
Qui, de sa tente ouvrant les toiles, 
Et priant au bord du chemin, 
Tranquille, montrait aux étoiles 
Ses mains teintes de sang humain; 
 
Qui donnait à boire aux épées, 
Et qui, rêveur mystérieux, 
Assis sur des têtes coupées, 
Contemplait la beauté des cieux  
 
--Victor Hugo65 
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 Since his resistance to the French began, the Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir was made the 
subject of a series of cultural, symbolic, and literary narratives throughout Europe.  
Indeed, in the British imagination in particular, he acquired an exalted status: Robert 
Browning and W.M. Thackeray transformed him into the epic hero of their verses.  We 
see the same phenomenon, moreover, in literature, painting, and music, with the Amīr 
being elevated into a mythic hero.   
For the French, on the other hand, the cultural narrative of the Amīr evolved 
tremendously throughout the course of their altercations with him.  During active combat 
with the Amīr, he was not outright villainized, but was often portrayed as an incorrigible 
thorn in the side of noble French imperial aims.66  Alexis de Tocqueville, the famed 
French theorist of democracy, had an apparent blind spot for French imperialism, and in 
his apologetics for the French colonial project in Algeria expresses his frustrations with 
the Amīr.  Though he does not outright vilify his adversary, “he also makes subtle 
allusions to the emir's fanaticism or tyranny, thus suggesting that the French army's 
violence was warranted because its opponent was as bad or worse.”67  After his capture, 
the narrative of the Amīr was transformed into that of a majestic and dignified spirit, 
properly tamed by the nobility of French imperial wisdom.  Here his religiosity is 
emphasized, with his likeness typically presented with prayer beads and a white robe.68 
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In both cases, the narrative presented of the Amīr served to bolster a central 
national myth.  For the British, ʿAbd al-Qādir “represented a foil to French imperial 
immorality,” which so far as the British were concerned was inherently immoral in 
contradistinction to the rival project of British imperialism.  Thus, “the act of portraying 
ʿAbd al-Qadir as an epic hero was in fact a means toward the larger end of villainising 
France.”69  For the French, he served the opposite role: his irreverent fanaticism at first 
bolstered the need for the noble French to continue to fight this powerful foe, and his 
subsequent magnanimity and grace was proof of the success of the French civilizing 
mission.   
I propose that the “symbol” analogy developed by Nora Achrati might prove 
useful in deconstructing contemporary historiography of the Amīr.  As Achrati and others 
have demonstrated, there is significant historical precedent in contorting or exaggerating 
the persona of the Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir for specific political and nationalist aims.  It 
might, then, be useful to keep this in mind upon encountering blind spots in present-day 
historiography of the figure.  We see here the ready applicability and salience of 
Achrati’s paradigm when dealing with the Amīr’s career in Algeria; it might, then, also 
prove useful in evaluating his subsequent career as an exile in Damascus, and more 
importantly, as a proponent of religious reform.  It is to this final stage in his life that we 
shall now turn.   
 
Surrender, Exile, and the Renewal of the Akbarīyya Legacy 
 
As part of the terms of his surrender to the French, the Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir al-
Jazāʾirī was promised the opportunity to live the rest of his life in exile in the Muslim 
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Mashriq—as previous parties of Algerians who had surrendered to the French had been 
allowed to do so.  But the Amīr was unlikely to have been able to anticipate the French 
Revolution of 1848, which brought down the monarchy of Louis-Philippe of Orleans that 
had underwritten the favorable terms of their Algerian adversary’s surrender.  The 
monarch’s republican successors were equally apprehensive about ʿAbd al-Qādir as a 
putative threat to French interests, yet felt insufficiently compelled to honor agreements 
made by their predecessors.  And so, they “found a simple, if apparently dishonourable, 
solution to the problem--they made Abd el-Kader a prisoner of the state.”70 
 First held in what John King refers to as “ignominious captivity” in the port of 
Toulon, ʿAbd al-Qādir was then imprisoned in France for five years – first at the Château 
of Pau, and then at the Château d’Amboise.  During this period, we can only speculate 
the full extent of his feelings of humiliation and betrayal while in French captivity—
although we do see instances of his expressing frustration at his involuntary confinement, 
his repeatedly being relocated, and at the idea that the French were so unfaithful to their 
promises in the first place.71  Still, he did draw solace from the presence of his immediate 
family and confidantes while in incarceration, and was granted the autonomy to receive 
guests and maintain a private living quarters.  Nonetheless, during his time in France, the 
Amīr kept himself busy mostly through private religious study.72  He remained in French 
captivity until 1853, when Louis Napoleon granted him clemency and allowed him to 
                                                 
70 John King, “Abd El-Kader and Arab Nationalism,” in Problems of the Modern Middle East in Historical 
Perspective: Essays in Honour of Albert Hourani, ed. John P. Spagnolo (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1992), 143. 
 
71 Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī, Tuḥfat al-zaʾir fī Tārīkh al-Jazāʾir (Beirut: Dar al-Yaqẓa al-
ʿArabīyyah, 1964), 514-530. 
72 John King, “Abd El-Kader and Arab Nationalism,” 144; Nora Achrati, “Following the Leader: A History 
and Evolution of the Amir ʿAbd Al-Qādir Al-Jazāʾirī as Symbol,” The Journal of North African Studies 12, 
no. 2 (June 2007): 141. 
30 
 
resettle, first in Bursa, Turkey, and, following a devastating earthquake there, ultimately 
in Damascus in 1855, where he spent the rest of his life.   
It is at this stage of his life and career that the Amīr fully turned his attention to 
matters of spiritual and religious reform.  More specifically, it was during this period that  
he began the spiritual journey that ultimately led him to the thought of al-Shaykh al-
Akbar (the Greatest Master), Ibn ʿArabī.  On the brink of an acute spiritual crisis, the 
Amīr came to see Ibn ʿArabī’s theosophical mysticism as the necessary salve to the 
predicament facing the Muslims of his day.  Such that, upon his arrival in Damascus, he 
dedicated himself fully to the teaching of Akbariyya thought, gathering a following with 
what came to be a highly influential circle of disciples, until his death in 1883.   
Before concluding this chapter, it would be useful to briefly discuss the  
religious and spiritual context of Damascus at the time, to fully understand how 
Akbarīyya doctrine in general, and the Akbarīyya-inspired reformism of the Amīr ʿAbd 
al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī in particular, was likely to have been received.  As I intimated 
previously, the Sufi order of the Naqshbandīyya-Mujaddīyya, under the leadership of 
Shaykh Khālid, had made significant inroads throughout the Ottoman Empire in the 
nineteenth century.  The Amīr’s reception in Syria, then, makes much more sense when 
viewed through the prism of the spiritual milieu generated by Shaykh Khālid in 
nineteenth-century Damascus.   
 
ʿAbd al-Qādir’s spiritual mission in Naqshbandīyya-Khālidīyya Damascus 
 By the time ʿAbd al-Qādir arrived in Damascus in 1855, Shaykh Khālid’s 
religious revival movement, under the auspices of the Naqshbandīyya-Mujaddīyya Sufi 
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ṭarīqa, had deeply penetrated the Ottoman Empire, and had established a firm footing in 
Syria in particular.  As I will demonstrate in this section, the peculiarities of the 
Naqshbandīyya-Khālidīyya proved quite hospitable for the Amīr to quickly establish 
himself in Shaykh Khālid’s home turf, so to speak.  I will not spend much time here 
addressing the details of Khālid’s spiritual doctrine.73  But to the extent that it is germane 
to the subject at hand, it is worth mentioning that Shaykh Khālid’s movement, in 
accordance with the Naqshbandī tradition more broadly, refrained from exalting their 
spiritual masters as necessarily superior to those outside the order.  Though the 
movement was quite insistent on the sharīʿah being inextricably linked to the spiritual 
path, Khālidī authors had no qualms about citing Sufi masters outside the Naqshbandī 
framework whom they felt maintained that commitment to the spiritual Law.74  Thus, 
given the ṭarīqa’s openness to the spiritual knowledge of outside Sufi masters, it is more 
likely that its adherents would be receptive to the thought propagated by a Qādirī leader 
like the Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir, so long as he sufficiently satisfied their concerns with 
sharīʿah compliance. 
 Furthermore, the ṭarīqa’s openness in this regard lent itself to remain hospitable 
to the controversial mysticism of Ibn ʿArabī.  Indeed, the early Naqshbandī tradition 
evinces a strong positive interest in al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s teachings.75  We see a notable 
exception to this tendency, though, in the thought of Aḥmad Sirhindī (d. 1624).  The 
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founder of the Mujaddīyya branch of the Naqshbandī ṭarīqa, and often described as the 
reviver of the second millennium in Islam (mujaddid  al-alf ath-thānī), Sirhindī had very 
strong reservations about the theosophy of al-Shaykh al-Akbar, particularly his doctrine 
on the “unity of being” (waḥdat al-wujūd).  Alarmed by its seeming endorsement of 
pantheism, Sirhindī replaced it with his own doctrine of “oneness of appearance” (waḥdat 
al-shuhūd), which suggests that any experience of unity between God and man is purely 
subjective, occurring only in the mind of the believer.   
Nonetheless, despite his misgivings, Sirhindī critiqued the thought of Ibn ʿArabī 
“with a certain trepidation and took pains to stress his overall respect for the great 
master.”76  His successors in the Mujaddīyya line, moreover, maintained a similar 
positive regard for Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings, often citing him alongside classical authorities 
of Sufism like Junayd and Ghazālī.77  Indeed, Shaykh Khālid maintained Ibn ʿArabī’s 
works in his library, and his major deputies—particularly Muḥammad al-Khānī—quoted 
him often in elucidating the Khālidi spiritual path.  Despite eschewing the immanent 
interpretation of the Akbariyya doctrine—which opened the door to pantheism—the 
Khālidī branch of the Naqshbandī ṭarīqa was indeed amenable to the more transcendental 
interpretation of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings, which tended to identify the mystical path with 
the duty to adhere to the sharīʿah and the sunna of the Prophet.78  As we shall see, the 
Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī’s reform methodology was largely based on this 
transcendental approach to the Akbariyya doctrine; as such, his teachings had a natural 
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valence with the Khālidīyya disciples and leadership that greeted him upon his arrival in 
Damascus.   
 Finally, the doctrinal congruence between ʿAbd al-Qādir’s reformism and the 
Khālidiyya aside, the Amīr had a ready audience in Damascus based on his previous 
associations with the Khālidiyya as a young man.  As mentioned earlier, in his early 
twenties ʿAbd al-Qādir visited Damascus en route back to Algeria following a Hajj 
pilgrimage alongside his father.  During that sojourn, he met Shaykh Khālid, who 
allowed him into the Naqshbandīyya path by assigning him to his key deputy, 
Muḥammad al-Khānī.  Upon his return to Damascus, ʿAbd al-Qādir quickly rekindled his 
established ties with the Khālidiyya, first reviving his friendship with Muḥammad al-
Khānī, who by that time had become a key figure in the Khālidīyya leadership.  Shortly 
thereafter, the Amīr established relationships with Khānī’s key disciples, among them 
Muḥammad al-Tanṭāwī, and Khānī’s son, Muḥammad al-Khānī the younger.  These men 
then became staunch devotees of the study of Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine under ʿAbd al-Qādir’s 
guidance, and the notes they took while under his tutelage formed the nucleus of the 
Kitāb al-Mawāqif.79 
 Indeed, even beyond his relationship with Khāni the elder, the Amīr managed to 
secure a critical mass of followers and disciples from precisely the families that a 
generation ago subscribed to the reformism spearheaded by Shaykh Khālid under the 
auspices of the Naqshbandī ṭarīqa:  
The correspondence between the Damascene ʿulama who 
joined the religion reform led by ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī 
under the inspiration of the Akbari teaching after 1855, and 
the group that belonged to the renewal movement headed 
by Shaykh Khālid within the framework of the Naqshbandī 
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order in 1823-1827, is indeed striking.  It can be seen both 
in the family affiliations of the ʿulama of the two 
generations and in the nature of their relationship to the 
heads of these two consecutive reform trends.  Thus, 
Muḥammad al-Khānī and ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Bīṭār, who 
figured prominently in ʿAbd al-Qādir's circle, were the sons 
of Khālid's most faithful adherents in the order in 
Damascus, his local deputy and his representative in the 
Maydān.80 
 
Weismann offers several explanations for this seeming continuum between the 
Khālidīyya and ʿAbd al-Qādir’s movement between the first and third quarters of 
nineteenth-century Damascus.  Among them, the most interesting in my view is that the 
reformist project spearheaded by Shaykh Khālid seemed compromised by the new 
political and economic circumstances emerging in Syria at the time.  Under the aegis of 
the Tanzimat reforms and European economic penetration into the Ottoman Empire, 
Weismann argues, Khālidīyya reformism lost its allure among a critical mass of its 
adherents.  The Akbarīyya revivalism propagated by ʿAbd al-Qādir, then, seemed more 
hospitable to accomplishing their reformist goals.  Accordingly, given these new realities, 
“to a large extent, the Akbarī theosophy replaced the Naqshbandī path as the most 
adequate articulation of these families' distresses and desires in the new circumstances 
emerging in Syria as a result of the two processes of the Tanzimat reforms and European 
economic penetration.”81 
 With this background, I can now more comfortably proceed to investigating ʿAbd 
al-Qādir’s thought on religious reform, as articulated in his writings.   
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Chapter 2: ʿAbd al-Qādir’s writings on Islamic Reform  
 Beginning with al-Miqrāḍ al-Ḥādd: Li-Qaṭʻ Lisān Muntaqiṣ dīn Al-Islām bi-al-
Bāṭil wa-al-Ilḥād, (Sharp Scissors to Cut the Tongue of the Slanderer of the Religion of 
Islam) composed while in French captivity, and followed by Dhikrā al-ʿĀqil wa-Tanbīh 
al-Ghāfil (Reminding the Rational Man and Alerting the Neglectful Man), which he 
wrote while in his original exilic location of Bursa, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī opens new 
vistas into the depths of his theological thought process.  In the Miqrāḍ, composed as a 
rebuttal to the accusations by a Catholic priest of the immorality of Islam, he sought to 
establish both the existence of God and the reality of prophethood, specifically through 
the use of reason (ʿaql).  Viewing reason as “the trait which distinguished man from other 
creatures,”82 the Amīr goes on to extol reason as wholly superior to the physical senses, 
and an indispensable faculty for coming to understand God.  To be clear, though, he does 
not acquiesce that reason alone is sufficient to understand God: as reason is not a source 
of moral values, and possesses no knowledge about the Divine, man needs prophets to 
guide him through the intricacies of the Unseen.  That said, while reason is itself 
incapable of replacing the message of the prophets, it is the only faculty available to man 
capable of grasping the logic of the prophetic guidance.83  
 In the Dhikrā, composed four years later at the behest of a French scientific 
committee that had enrolled him in their register of scholars, the Amīr reiterates the 
centrality of the rational sciences, now in contradistinction to the dangers of imitation 
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(taqlīd).84  “The intelligent person,” he insisted, “must consider the statement rather than 
the person who is stating it,”85 as blind emulation uninformed by the intellect can lead to 
disastrous consequences for the Muslim community.  Here again he affirms that the 
sciences of the prophets are superior to intellectual knowledge, considering the use of 
unbridled reason to the exclusion of prophetic guidance no less problematic than 
uninformed imitation: “Those who call on people to adopt pure imitative knowledge and 
avoid rationality are ignorant, while those who are satisfied with rationality at the 
expense of the revealed sciences are deluded.”86  He instead advocates combining both 
approaches, whereby the rational sciences and the revealed sciences complement and 
nurture one another interdependently:   
The rational sciences are like nourishment and the revealed 
sciences are like medication.  The sick may be harmed by 
food if they neglect their medicine.  Similarly, the minds of 
all creatures are sick, and there is no treatment for them but 
the medications prepared by the prophets, namely the 
duties of worship.  Those who are satisfied with rational 
knowledge will be harmed by it like the sick person who is 
harmed by food; as happens to some.87 
 
Another key theme in the Dhikrā is the fundamental harmony between Islam and 
the other revealed religions.  Much as his admirers in the 19th century applauded him for 
compassion towards non-Muslims, here the Amīr eschews rigid bifurcations between the 
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faiths.88  Instead, he stresses that the truth possessed by the monotheistic religions is 
essentially one.  Adopting inclusive language making constant reference to “the 
prophets” (al-anbiyāʾ)89, he goes so far as to explicitly suggest that Muslims and 
Christians, despite their doctrinal differences, are essentially brothers:90  
For all prophets have proclaimed that the true religion is 
one, even if they disagree in some of their particular laws.  
They are like men of one father and different mothers: to 
deny all of them, or to deny some and affirm the truth of 
others, is deficient.  If the Muslims and Christians listened 
to me [on this matter], the differences between them would 
disappear, and they would become brothers—outwardly 
and inwardly alike.91 
 
Finally, as a corollary to his support for the use of ʿaql, in this volume the Amīr 
issues a clarion call for believers and followers of the prophets to embrace rather than 
eschew the  benefits of modern science.  No doubt directing his critique at conservative 
religious scholars who rely excessively on taqlīd, here he reminds his reader that 
inveighing against the purported immorality or inadmissibility of modern science is 
outside the domain of the prophetic path.  The science of the prophets concerns itself 
primarily with what is beneficial to mankind, both in this life and in the hereafter.  
Accordingly, then: 
The prophets did not come into being in order to refute the 
philosophers, or to repudiate the sciences of medicine, 
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astronomy, or geometry—which they considered in tune 
with the doctrine of God’s transcendental oneness—but 
rather to ascribe all the world’s phenomena to the Lord’s 
power and will.92  
 
Not only, the Amīr continues, does modern science not pose any discernible threat to the 
religion as such, but to inveigh against science as inimical to religion is actually to 
commit a grave sin.  Even grander of a sin, he goes so far to say, than outright rejecting 
the prophets altogether (emphasis mine): 
They did not come to refute that bodies are composed of a 
combination of the four elements, or that the earth is round, 
or that the moon’s eclipse is caused by the earth standing 
exactly between it and the sun, for none of these assertions 
contradict the message of the Prophets.  The only issue the 
Prophets are interested in is whether the universe is created 
or pre-eternal.  Once the createdness of the universe is 
established, it does not matter whether the earth is round or 
flat, or how many levels the heavens compromise.  All that 
matters is that this is the work of God.  And whosoever tries 
to refute these things for the sake of God’s religion has 
committed a crime against it, and in fact causes more harm 
to the sharīʿah than its self-avowed detractors.93 
 
From these two works, we see that the religious thought of the Amīr ʿAbd al-
Qādir al-Jazāʾirī transcends the peculiarities of his role as a resistance leader in French-
occupied Algeria.  Indeed, in decrying the arbitrary constrictions placed on the 
community of believers by taqlīd, in emphasizing the fundamental compatibility between 
revelation and reason, in embracing the material benefits of the scientific method, and in 
extolling the brotherhood between Muslims and Christians, the Amīr’s message speaks to 
religious reformism more broadly.  In line with the thought of other major nineteenth-
century Muslim intellectual figures, ʿAbd al-Qādir’s religious worldview seems to 
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articulate a renewed critical engagement with the Islamic tradition in the aftermath of 
modernity, particularly under the yoke of European colonial rule.  His engagement with 
religious tajdīd, moreover, comes to full fruition in the Kitāb al-Mawāqif.  
 The Amīr’s deepest spiritual insights during this final chapter in his life are 
addressed most succinctly in his third and final book, the Kitāb al-Mawāqif fi al-Waʿz 
wal-Irshād (The Book of Stops for Preaching and Guidance).  Composed as a series of 
numbered aphorisms, offering commentary and interpretation on Qurʿānic verses and 
Ḥadīth reports, each mawqif (stop)—a reference to the stops between the stations on the 
Sufi path—was unmistakably infused with Ibn ʿArabī’s theosophical mysticism, both in 
content and in its highly associative linguistic style.  These interpretations, moreover, 
were experienced by ʿAbd al-Qādir directly as mystical revelations from the Divine.  The 
Mawāqif, then, offer a unique glimpse into the Amīr’s spiritual maturation during the 
final stage in his life.94   
 Accordingly, I will be spending the bulk of this chapter focusing on the Mawāqif, 
with a particular emphasis on the spiritual reform methodology it articulates, and on the 
interpretation of that methodology in Western historiography.  As full disclosure, I will 
not here be offering a meticulous primary analysis of Ibn ʿArabī’s theosophy more 
broadly, but will be relying on secondary sources and commentaries of Akbarī doctrine 
when necessary.  My primary concern here, after all, is not Akbarī doctrine as such, but 
the Amīr’s use of that doctrine as the basis of a religious reform movement.  As for the 
text of the Mawāqif itself, while I will be making direct reference to it here, I will also be 
relying on secondary sources as appropriate.  My goal in this section is to offer a general 
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overview of the Mawāqif’s reform methodology, rather than a detailed commentary of 
the text.  That said, I will indeed offer a more rigorous analysis and commentary of the 
primary sources, with translation when appropriate, in the next chapter.   
 
The Kitāb al Mawāqif and Islamic Revivalism  
 At its outset, the Amīr’s spiritual project as articulated in the Kitāb al Mawāqif 
was one motivated by a strong sense of purpose, to rescue the Muslim umma by guiding 
it back to the true religion.  He perhaps most succinctly articulates this sense of mission, 
and the centrality of Ibn ʿArabī and his teachings to accomplishing its objectives, by way 
of a dream.  In it ʿAbd al-Qādir relates seeing his spiritual master in the form of a lion, 
holding a large chain in its hand.  The beast then commanded the Amīr to put his hand in 
its mouth and, despite his fear, he complied.  Upon doing so, the lion reverted to Ibn 
ʿArabī’s human form, with which ʿAbd al-Qādir was intimately familiar, based on his 
many previous dreams featuring al-Shaykh al-Akbar.  In fact, elsewhere in the Mawāqif, 
the Amīr reveals that it was in the liminal space of the dream world that he studied Ibn 
ʿArabī’s al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīyya directly with its author.95  Though in this introductory 
vision, the great master was incoherent and confused (majdhūb), repeatedly uttering that 
he was going to die, before finally falling to the floor.96 
At this point the Amīr awakens, and proceeds to offer his interpretation of the 
vision.  Ibn ʿArabī’s appearance as a lion signifies his exalted status among the Sufi 
saints (awliyāʾ Allah tʿālā), while the chain in his hand represents the Islamic sharīʿah.  
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Putting his hand in the beast’s mouth signifies ʿAbd al-Qādir’s dedication and reliance to 
the teachings of Ibn ʿArabī, for he regarded all of his spiritual insights as having derived 
from the great master.  As for al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s status as a majdhūb, ʿAbd al-Qādir 
sees his master’s confused state as indicative of the troubles of the time, with 
moderation—and, ostensibly, commitment to the sharīʿah—being lost amidst great 
changes.  Amidst such a tumultuous period, the Amīr continues, Ibn ʿArabī, in repeatedly 
proclaiming he was going to die, was lamenting that the Muslims had come to disobey 
the commandments of Allah and His prophet, and of shunning their religion.97 
Seeing a crisis facing his religious community amidst the rapid transformation of 
Muslim society—brought on in no small part by the material realities of European 
colonialism—the Amīr took it upon himself to rescue the ummah and guide it back to the 
true faith.  In his very first mawqif, he articulates the foundations for his Akbarī-inspired 
system of religious renewal.  While maintaining that the Sufis do not bring anything new 
to the religion, he argues that they do have a new understanding of it.  Their mystical 
insights neither violate nor reject the literal meaning of scripture, but they do find in them 
additional inner meanings which were hitherto unknown.  Careful to anchor his position 
in the prophetic traditions, which testify to the many faces of the Qurʾān—unveiled by 
the Sufi path, and by reason—ʿAbd al-Qādir posits that mystical revelation may unveil an 
entirely new understanding of a verse or tradition that did not even cross the minds of 
previous generations of scholarly and Sufi commentators.  “In ʿAbd al-Qādir’s eyes, the 
Qurʾān thus constitutes a source of perpetual renewal in Islam, facilitating ever new 
interpretations that do not contradict the tradition, but rather add to it new layers of 
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meaning, according to the revelations of the Sufi saints in every generation.”98  The 
Mawāqif, moreover, constitute in large part such a renewed interpretation of scripture and 
tradition, as revealed to the Amīr by the spiritual unveiling along the Sufi path.   
It is precisely because of his insistence that each generation of Sufi saints 
commands the capacity for renewing the Islamic tradition that the Amīr is so antagonistic 
towards the ʿulamāʾ of his day, whose blind acceptance of ancient scriptural 
commentaries (taqlīd) unnecessarily restricted the tradition’s regenerative potentialities.  
Still, despite his staunch opposition to the taqlīd of the traditional scholars of his day, 
whom he derisively refers to as “ʿulamāʾ al-rasm, a term which may be rendered as "the 
formal scholars," or as he himself defines them, “those who are content with the mere 
name of knowledge,”99 ʿAbd al-Qādir instructs his disciples to avoid any outright 
confrontation with them.  Instead, they should feel pity for their lot, even if they express 
indignation and actively conflict.100 
The Amīr is less forgiving, though, when he addresses the rationalist theologians 
(mutakallimūn), for whom he reserves his most scathing criticisms.  In particular, he 
excoriates the mutakallimūn for attempting to know God through their intellects rather 
than through His divine providence.  This is not to suggest that the Amīr discourages the 
use of reason; as his previous two volumes make clear, he sees the use of reason (ʿaql) as 
a religious requirement for believing Muslims.  But with that said, he does caution his 
readers about the limits of reason.  More specifically, "he repeatedly reiterates in the 
Mawāqif that reason can lead only to the point of acknowledging God's existence and 
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unity, beyond which divine guidance, as handed down by the prophets, becomes 
necessary."101  Reason, then, is sufficient for worldly matters, but is not a substitute for 
obeying revelation.  ʿAbd al-Qādir finds the mutakallimūn’s reliance on unbridled reason 
particularly problematic, moreover, because the limits of their own logical principles put 
their approach at odds with his ever-renewing approach to scriptural exegesis.  As 
Weismann explains, “ʿAbd al-Qādir argues that what the rationalists regard as their God 
is something bounded and limited by their own logical principles.  The God of the 
prophets and their followers, by contrast, is unbounded, unlimited, and capable of doing 
whatever He wishes, even that which the rationalists claim to be impossible.”102  
Perpetually renewing the Islamic tradition to match the needs of each generation, the 
Amīr argues, is ill accomplished through the inherent restrictions of the intellect.  Rather, 
it can only be fully realized through the boundless possibilities offered by the mystical 
unveiling of Divine knowledge.  Put another way, the discursive approach of the 
theologians is inherently limited; the experiential approach of the Sufi path is not.   
Having established scriptural renewal as the foundation of his methodology, ʿAbd 
al-Qādir moves on to posit Ibn ʿArabī’s concept of waḥdat al-wujūd (the “Unity of 
Being”) as the center of the Akbarīyya doctrine.103  ʿAbd al-Qādir views this idea of the 
Unity of Being as the mystical station of separation (furqān), in which God’s earthly 
creatures are perceived as subsisting in Him.  In this station, “the divine attributes and the 
relative diversity are simultaneously present, and it is obligatory to fulfill the 
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commandments and be concerned with worldly affairs, as required by the Shariʿa.”104  
Implying a mutuality between God and His creatures, Ibn ʿArabī maintained that the two 
were as if mutually dependent: just as God’s creatures (in potential) require Him to be 
realized, God in turn requires His creatures to make manifest His manifestations.  Based 
on this mutuality, ʿAbd al-Qādir, believed, the experiential knowledge of God as revealed 
through the Sufi path (maʿrifa) is disclosed from a combination of these two perspectives, 
the divine and the earthly.105  Accordingly, those on the Sufi path are not exempt from 
their material responsibilities to engage worldly affairs. 
Yet the Amīr is very clear to point out that this mutuality is not an endorsement of 
pantheism, as it is vested entirely in God, the only One who really exists.  “Whatever is 
found on earth,” then, “is in a state of non-existence, and the perception of existence is 
merely an illusion of the senses or of the intellect.”106  That said, ʿAbd al-Qādir, like Ibn 
ʿArabī, makes a distinction between two different degrees of non-existence, one relative 
(fanāʾ or thubūt) and the other absolute (ʿadam maḥḍ).  In proclaiming that the entire 
world is imaginary, he clarifies, he is referring to a relative non-existence: the world is 
neither the essential truth (ʿayn al-haqq), nor is it wholly untrue (ghayr al-haqq), but 
within the truth one part is depicted as created, and the other as God.  Beyond this, there 
is the absolutely existence of God within Himself, “which cannot be grasped and against 
which stands nothingness.”107  Thus, “in the true reality (al-wujūd al-haqīqī) there is 
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nothing but His exalted essence, while all the world is in the imaginary reality (al-wujūd 
al-khayālī).”  
Furthermore, Ibn ʿArabī’s system offers two stages by which God is manifested in 
this “imaginary reality.”  First is His revelation to Himself in the world of the unseen 
(ʿālam al-ghayb) in the form of immutable essences yearning to be realized (al-aʿyān al-
thābita).  Only after this first stage does He reveal Himself in the visible world (ʿālam al-
shahāda) through these immutable essences, in the form of actual appearances.  The form 
of each appearance, though, is not determined by God in his capacity as Creator, but by 
the inherent capability (istiʿdād) of its immutable essence to reflect God.  By extension, 
then, it is not God as Creator, in the second stage of His revelation (that is, His revelation 
in the visible world), that determines the character of man, but instead it is man’s 
predisposition of his own immutable essence, as already established beforehand in God’s 
revelation to Himself.108    
On the basis of this principle of istiʿdād, ʿAbd al-Qādir saw the potential to fully 
realize his yearning to adapt the Islamic tradition to the needs of his generation—while of 
course remaining faithful to the letter of the scripture, as discussed previously.  For, if the 
Creator is revealed in the immutable essences according to their inherent predispositions, 
it follows that God conducts the visible world through the laws of nature.  From this, 
ʿAbd al-Qādir argues that God cannot change man’s predestined inclination, as it 
emanates from his inner nature rather than from his conscious will.  Accordingly, he 
concludes, in the “imaginary reality” in which man lives, he must acquiesce to his nature 
which demands him to rely on himself, rather than ask God for what does not suit him.  
By extension, this principle may be formulated thus that, since man must accept reality as 
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it is, it is incumbent upon him to work within it rather than ask refuge from it in God.”109  
And since it is man’s potential disposition to know the world through his reason (ʿaql), 
self-reliance based on his istiʿdād necessarily implies acquiring the worldly sciences by 
his intellect.110 
Based on this rationalist-oriented understanding of istiʿdād, the Amīr posited a 
reform methodology that included three principal positions.  One was an emphasis on the 
importance of science and reason for human well-being, and the need of the Muslims to 
fully utilize it to progress materially.  This outlook is congruent not only with the 
discussion of istiʿdād I outlined above, but also with the content of his two previous 
books, which similarly urged the need for Muslims to make use of their rational faculties.  
The second principal position in the Amīr’s scheme was a sense of kindness towards 
Christians.  To be clear, he does not deny the duty of waging jihād against the opponent 
of Islam, until they pay the poll tax and are subdued, but he describes this as the most 
difficult requirement for the Sufis to oblige, and nonetheless stresses the need to have 
special compassion for the People of the Book.111  It is this ethic, moreover, that 
undergirded the Amīr’s celebrated efforts to protect thousands of local Christians and 
European consuls from massacre in 1860.  As a caveat, I should point out that the 
secondary literature does not adequately explain how this position fully relates to the 
Amīr’s adaptation of the Akbarīyya legacy; I will attempt to explore this question further 
in my own analysis of the primary sources, in the next chapter. 
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Third, he argues for an outright abstention from political affairs.  Referring to the 
famous prophetic saying, enjoining Muslims to remove evil, be it by the hand, tongue, or 
heart, ʿAbd al-Qādir suggests that the Sufis, inasmuch as they realize man’s status as 
mere receptacles for reflecting God’s manifestation (according to his istiʿdād), are 
absolved of this requirement to remove evil altogether.112  The Amīr’s call to shun 
politics, moreover, was allegedly designed to prevent religious objection to the 
modernizing thrust of the Ottoman government’s Tanzimat reforms.113  And finally, it is 
worth mentioning that dissatisfaction with this quietist approach ultimately paved the 
way for the politically activist model of Ibn Taymiyya coming to dominate the religious 
and political scene in Damascus after ʿAbd al-Qādir’s death.114 
Having outlined the basic tenets of the Amīr’s reform methodology, I will now 
move on to the reception and interpretation of that methodology in Western scholarship.  
Here I will be relying on the work of David Dean Commins, and of Itzchak Weismann, 
two Western scholars who have written in some detail about this period of the Amīr’s 
life.  As we will see, despite both scholars coming to significantly different conclusions 
in their interpretations of the Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī’s role as a Muslim reformer, 
they nonetheless ground their positions on largely the same premises.   
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ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī through the eyes of his interpreters 
 David Dean Commins discusses ʿAbd al-Qādir’s life in Syria in the context of a 
study of Islamic reformist tendencies more broadly in late Ottoman Syria.115  Though his 
treatment of ʿAbd al-Qādir’s career and role as an Islamic reformer in this volume is 
quite brief, Commins does succinctly summarize the Amīr’s career in Algeria, and offers 
a compelling narrative of his career in exile, of his renewed emphasis on reason as 
articulated in the Dhikrā, and the impact on this rationalist trend in religious thought on 
the Salafi movement that later gained footing in Damascus.   
Moreover, Commins further elaborates on the Amīr’s role as an Islamic reformer 
in a journal article dedicated exclusively to this issue.116  Here he more thoroughly 
discusses the religious thought of ʿAbd al-Qādir, as articulated in the Kitāb al-Mawāqif, 
specifically in contradistinction to his earlier works.  Arguing against the idea that the 
Mawāqif is a completion of the Amīr’s earlier works, Commins sees it as a shift in focus 
from a rationalist character to that of scripturalist Sufism.  So convinced is Commins that 
the content of the Mawāqif marks a break in ʿAbd al-Qādir’s religious thought process 
that he goes through considerable effort to explain why the Amīr so dramatically shifted 
his outlook in this regard.  He posits that the young ʿAbd al-Qādir’s early interactions 
with Shaykh Khālid may have been responsible for his sharīʿia-minded predilections, but, 
realizing that the Amīr did not spread Khālid’s doctrine upon returning to Algeria, makes 
sure to qualify his speculation with the caveat “[w]hether or not al-Shaykh Khālid 
profoundly influenced young ʿAbd al-Qādir we may never know unless documents 
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surface that shed more light on this episode.”117  “It is also possible,” Commins 
continues, “that when ʿAbd al-Qādir was in the Ḥijāz he came into contact with ulama 
sympathetic to the call of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, but we have no evidence of 
that.”118   
Commins’ argument here strikes me as incoherent, for two reasons.  First, it 
seems odd for him to be so flippantly speculative: if, as he admits, there is presently no 
evidence for the positions he advances, then why speculate about them in the first place?  
And second, despite all his efforts to draw a binary distinction between the emphasis on 
reason in the Amīr’s earlier books and the “sharīʿah-minded Sufism” of the Mawāqif, he 
goes on to argue that the Mawāqif do not contradict the principles manifest in ʿAbd al-
Qādir’s earlier work: "These strictures on the limits of reason do not represent an 
abandonment of Jazāʾirī’s earlier essays, for they too drew a boundary between 
knowledge attainable by reason and knowledge accessible only through prophecy.”119  
Nonetheless, despite the inconsistency of his argument and the tenuousness of his 
conjectures, it is quite clear that Commins unabashedly does not consider ʿAbd al-Qādir a 
Muslim reform figure in the truest sense of the expression: instead, he argues, “[w]hile al- 
Jazāʾirī laid the foundation for Islamic reform in Damascus, he cannot be counted among 
its advocates or its early formulators.  Rather he appears to represent a sharīʿah-minded 
Sufi who elevated the place of reason in Islam.”120 
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This assessment is entirely at odds with the thesis brought forth by Itzchak 
Weismann, who not only sees the Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī as a bona fide Islamic 
reformer, but who sees his Sufi treatise as the culmination—rather than an 
abandonment—of the reformist thought articulated in his first two books.  Despite the 
different character of the Sufi-oriented Kitāb al-Mawāqif from his earlier works, 
Weismann insists, they were actually two different manifestations of the same teaching:  
ʿAbd al-Qādir evidently regarded his two first books as an 
explanation suitable for the level of understanding of the 
common people...These writings constitute, therefore, the 
external aspect of his teaching.  ʿAbd al-Qādir’s collection 
of mystical passages, on the other hand…constitute the 
inner aspect of his teaching.  As a sufi of the Akbarī school, 
ʿAbd al-Qādir viewed these two aspects as the two opposite 
standpoints from which the truth may be beheld: the divine 
standpoint, which is attained by means of mystical 
experience, and the human standpoint, which is acquired 
through logical judgment based on perception.121  
 
Like Commins, Weismann acknowledges that the Mawāqif inveighs against the 
unrestricted reliance on reason.  But unlike Commins, Weismann does not seem to think 
this contradicts the overall continuity of the Amīr’s reform project.  As we have seen 
previously in the discussion of the Akbarī doctrine, man’s istiʿdād enjoins on him the 
requirement to deal with reality according to his own natural disposition to know the 
material world through his intellect.  Reason and mystical unveiling, Weismann would 
suggest, complement rather than oppose one another.   
Moreover, Weismann sees the system of religious thought propagated in the Kitāb 
al-Mawāqif as constituting a bona fide reform methodology.  Like Commins, Weismann 
deals with the person of the Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī in the context of Islamic 
reform in late Ottoman Damascus more broadly.  But unlike Commins, Weismann is 
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deliberate in his engagement with the spiritual methodology articulated in the Kitāb al-
Mawāqif, going so far as to attempt to traverse the unfathomable depths of the Akbariyya 
doctrine which lay at the foundations of the Amīr’s final tome.122  In his monograph, 
Weismann discusses the Amīr’s use and interpretation of Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine in the 
Kitāb al-Mawāqif, and discusses the place of Akbariyya doctrine in the triumvirate of 
Islamic religious reformist trends in late Ottoman Damascus—first the Naqshbandīyya-
Khālidīyya, then the Akbarīyya, then finally the Salafīyya.   
 But Weismann does not stop there.  Particularly in an article published in the 
Journal of the Muhyiddīn Ibn ʿArabī Society, Weismann attempts to fully explicate the 
Amīr’s interpretation of Ibn ʿArabī’s theosophical mysticism as a system for Islamic 
religious reform.  Referring to a passage from the Kitāb al-Mawāqif in which the Amīr 
sees Ibn ʿArabī in a dream, Weismann argues that ʿAbd al-Qādir took on the Akbarīyya 
mantle specifically as a response to the troubles befalling the Muslims under the yoke of 
modernity; ʿAbd al-Qādir’s system of spiritual refinement, then, as articulated in his final 
tome, was to bring Islam in line with the needs of the modern world.123  Weismann then 
elaborates on the Amīr’s specific use of tenets of the Akbarīyya doctrine to articulate: a 
renewed interest in reason and the scientific method; compassion towards religious 
minorities; and a commitment to humanism more broadly.124 
 That said, despite the fundamentally different conclusions Weismann and 
Commins reach in their analysis of the Amīr as a reform figure, they both largely 
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coalesce on one major point, which will be my primary preoccupation in this section.  
That is, they both suggest that ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī’s interest in material progress and 
rationalism is ultimately contrived, or less than fully derived from Islamic principles per 
se.  In Commins’ case, some of his comments on this issue are somewhat tame, and leave 
room for interpretation.  But as a whole, they do seem to suggest this tendency, as I will 
demonstrate below.   
For instance, he ends his journal article by pondering some of his uncertainties in 
comprehending ʿAbd al-Qādir’s thought process over the course of his career.  In that 
discussion, he posits “[t]he stress on reason may have stemmed from the need for 
pragmatism in relations with the French, or alternatively during his sojourn in France, 
where he encountered Christian propaganda against Islam of the kind that inspired his 
1848 essay.”125  Then, he concludes this point, and the essay, by acknowledging that his 
argument is ultimately speculative: “[t]hese suggestions are of a hypothetical nature, and 
a more complete explanation of ʿAbd al-Qadir's reformist tendencies can only emerge 
from a reevaluation of his life that integrates the various facets and stages of his 
career.”126  I have already addressed the questionable nature of this sort of speculation, 
and thus won’t discuss that again here.  But more importantly for our purposes, this 
appraisal by Commins, at face value, seems to suggest that the Amīr’s interest in reason 
was inorganic, so to speak.  That is, it suggests that the Amīr’s stress and emphasis on 
reason in his religious thought process was either one based on expediency and 
opportunism, or somehow thrust upon him based on his interactions with the French, to 
defend Islam from its defamers.  Again, this passage is not particularly detailed, and 
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leaves the possibility for several readings, of which the one I offer above may not be 
entirely accurate; Commins’ brevity allows for ambiguity in its interpretation.   
 But in other passages, he is not as reserved or ambiguous on this issue.  After 
outlining ʿAbd al-Qādir’s attitudes towards reason and revelation, as first articulated in 
his second book, Dhikrā al-ʿĀqil wa-Tanbīh al-Ghāfil, Commins goes on to argue that 
the Amīr’s position is an anomaly in the Islamic tradition:  
The ideas Jazāʾirī expressed on reason and revelation 
represented a minority position in the history of Islamic 
thought, one held by rationalist philosophers and which 
was gaining strength as the nineteenth century progressed.  
That tradition's elevation of reason was appositive to 
Muslims' search for indigenous sources to affirm the 
principles of science that seemed to lie at the basis of 
progress.127 
 
At this point Commins had established little more than that the Amīr advocated the use of 
reason and intellect instead of blindly placating authorities (that is, to rely solely on 
taqlīd), and that he saw rational knowledge as complementary to the understanding of 
revealed knowledge, which itself is irreplaceable.  Despite Commins’ claims to the 
contrary, such an outlook is not a particularly radical or contentious one in the trajectory 
of Islamic intellectual history.  The tradition of Islamic dialectical theology, or ʿilm al-
kalām, for instance, operates on such a paradigm, as we have seen previously.  Indeed, 
the Amīr excoriated the practitioners of kalām, the mutakallimūn, for relying excessively 
on their intellect to know God, to the detriment of the mystical unveiling characteristic of 
the spiritual path.  The kalām tradition, moreover, enjoyed a perfectly healthy status in 
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the history of Islamic thought, having been practiced by some of the most revered figures 
in what is typically considered Islamic orthodoxy, namely Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī.128   
It is rather grandiose, then, for Commins to claim that such an uncontroversial 
position “represented a minority position in the history of Islamic thought.”  Commins is 
correct to the extent that rationalist philosophy (that is, the tradition of falsafa) could 
reasonably be considered a minority position, but his argument here is highly 
reductionist, for as we have seen in the case of kalām, the falsafa tradition claimed no 
monopoly over the formula advocated here by the Amīr (that is, the acceptability of 
reason as a mode of inquiry, and its compatibility with revelation.)    In reducing 
rationality to the falsafa tradition, and in ultimately suggesting that deference to blind 
taqlīd while shunning the exercise of reason was intellectually normative throughout the 
Islamic tradition, Commins’ analysis here seems grossly oversimplified.   
In contradistinction to Commins’ analysis, Itzchak Weismann is even less 
reserved on this issue.  Repeatedly in his work on the Amīr, he unequivocally suggests 
that ʿAbd al-Qādir’s reform methodology was motivated by a desire to appropriate 
Western rationalism—the implication, of course, being that the Amīr acknowledged 
rationalism as Western as such.  This impulse, Weismann argues, was first cultivated 
during his confinement in France: 
The decisive period in the spiritual development of Amīr 
ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī was deferred, however, until after 
his surrender to the French in 1847.  Contrary to the 
stipulations of the treaty signed with him, ʿAbd al-Qādir 
was taken under guard to France.  Here he initially enjoyed 
a certain amount of freedom, thanks to which he became 
one of those few Muslim reformers, such as the Young 
Ottomans and the Egyptian Rifāʿa al-Tahṭāwī, who were 
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able to realize at first hand the material progress attained by 
Europe through its new rationalist--scientific approach.  In 
the wake of the 1848 revolution ʿAbd al-Qādir's situation 
deteriorated, as his large entourage was separated from him 
and he was allowed almost no contact with the outside 
world.  In this period of disillusionment and despair he 
went through an acute spiritual crisis, which led him to the 
teaching of Ibn ʿArabī. 128F129 
 
Immediately following this passage, Weismann footnotes two texts: a section from a 
historical biography composed by ʿAbd al-Qādir’s son Muḥammad, 129F130 and a section from 
a book by Jawād Murābiṭ, dealing specifically with ʿAbd al-Qādir’s relationship to 
Sufism. 130F131  But surprisingly, neither of these two selections seems to support or justify 
the assertions Weismann is making.  The selection from Murābit’s book discusses how 
the the Amīr did indeed undergo a spiritual crisis while being imprisoned by the 
French—during which he eventually sees the Prophet Muḥammad in a dream—and ends 
with a conversion to the thought of al-Shaykh Muḥyī al-dīn Ibn ʿArabī.  Yet nowhere in 
the passage does Murābit invoke any discussion of European material progress, its 
rationalist worldview, or the Amīr’s having been impressed by it.   
The passage from the Tuḥfat al-zaʾir, moreover, similarly lacks any such 
reference.  The nearly twenty-page selection certainly does refer to the Amīr’s stay in 
French captivity, his negotiations with the French in this respect, and his being repeatedly 
transferred to different locations, but there is no mention whatsoever of the Amīr’s 
purported admiration of European rationalism during this period.  In fact, not only does 
the selection make no reference to ʿAbd al-Qādir’s being impressed by Europe’s new 
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rationalist-scientific approach, but it specifically refers to the Amīr bemoaning his 
mistreatment at the hands of his captors.  After all, he had been promised clemency in 
exchange for his surrender, only for the French to renege on their agreement and instead 
incarcerate him.  Under such inauspicious circumstances, it would not be unreasonable 
for the Amīr to have a less-than-positive outlook toward the French.  For instance, shortly 
after realizing that he had been double-crossed, and lamenting the fact that he and his 
men were duped into French incarceration, he has the following gut-wrenching exchange 
with the French Colonel Dumas: 
As the Amir's grief became even more intense, the Colonel 
Dumas began to speak to him with kind words, and with 
amiability and good will.  And the Amir replied: 
  
If things remain in this state much longer, many of us will 
undoubtedly die out of sadness.  And I am the only one 
responsible for this.  Because no one thought it was a good 
idea to come to the French, except me.  And the thing that 
deceived me, and delivered me into their hands, is their 
claim that they are a people that do not violate their 
covenants, and do not go back on their promise.   
But in fact, these people don’t know how to hold a 
promise…  Or, better yet, they do make covenants, but only 
covenants predicated on lies and deception.   
 
If I knew that there were a just court or political body 
anywhere in this entire country, one that hears the claims of 
the wrong and oppressed, and delivers them justice against 
their opponent…  Or if there were a king with enough 
power to do this…  Then I would have raised my case.  
And maybe they would have helped me, and maybe they 
would have taken my side.   
 
At this the colonel could not say or do anything, except 
express his deep regret and heartache over the situation.  
And it’s in God’s hands!!!132 
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Such an elegy, suffice it to say, is barely recognizable from the propitious account 
offered by Weismann.  And Weismann’s optimism in this respect is not limited to the 
passage quoted above, for nowhere in any of his writings does he offer even cursory 
acknowledgment ʿAbd al-Qādir’s feelings of mistreatment and resentment towards the 
French.  Not only, then, do the sources Weismann footnotes here make no reference to 
the Amīr appreciating European rationalism, but they raise the possibility that 
Weismann’s assertions more generally may be counterfactual or embellished.  This is not 
to suggest that the Amīr’s experience in French captivity can be reduced to the passage I 
translated above, but the fact that his overall feelings of betrayal are entirely absent from 
Weismann’s report suggests a serious omission on his part.   
 Nonetheless, Weismann unhesitatingly presses on with this thesis, insisting on a 
binary relationship between the Amīr’s conceptualization and newfound appreciation for 
Europe on the one hand, and his spiritual development on the other.  Later on the same 
page, he proceeds to justify his position under the auspices of the Amīr’s change of heart 
toward the French (emphasis mine):  
The new attitude that ʿAbd al-Qādir adopted toward 
Western civilization in consequence of his experience in 
France became apparent after his release by Napoleon III in 
1852.  He now participated in various official events and 
enjoyed conversing with generals and scientists…While on 
a visit to Paris during the Crimean War, ʿAbd al-Qādir took 
part in a prayer of thanksgiving in the Church of Notre 
Dame, and expressed his admiration for the technical 
innovations he saw in the international exhibition then 
taking place in the French capital.133 
 
ʿAbd al-Qādir’s willingness to engage French officials in cooperative conversation may 
indeed indicate a new attitude toward the French, but does it suggest a new attitude 
                                                 
133 Itzchak Weismann, Taste of Modernity, 150. 
58 
 
toward Western Civilization tout court?  Without knowing more about the auspices of the 
meetings in question, this assertion seems problematic.   
Weismann ends this selection by footnoting a well-known biography of ʿAbd al-
Qādir composed by British officer Charles Henry Churchill, based largely on the Amīr’s 
own dictations.  But surprisingly, rather than rely on the English-language original, he 
instead refers to an Arabic-language translation as his reference.134  I can only speculate 
as to why Weismann made such a decision, but nevertheless, I went through the Arabic 
translation and found the reference in question.  Rather than translate it here myself, 
though, I will instead rely on the relevant passage from the original, which reads:  
Whilst Abdel Kader was in Paris, the news of the fall of 
Sebastopol arrived.  He was asked to assist at the 
celebration of the Te Deum in Notre Dame; and he was told 
that the Emperor would be flattered by his presence on the 
occasion.  Though prostrated by a recent severe illness, he 
consented to go.  No small sensation was created amongst 
the vast throng which filled the cathedral, as Abdel Kader 
advanced up to the altar, leaning on the arm of a French 
marshal, and accompanied by other officers of rank.  On 
leaving it he was loudly cheered.  The principal aide-de-
camp of the Minister of War conducted him over the 
International Exhibition, which on the year of this visit 
made Paris the rendezvous of all the civilized world.  After 
viewing all the varied productions which it contained, he 
paused for a long time in perfect astonishment at the 
marvellous [sic] elaborations of machinery which expanded 
in various compartments before his eyes. Then he suddenly 
exclaimed, “Surely this is the temple of reason and 
intelligence, animated by the breath of God.”135 
 
This passage certainly suggests a more amiable relationship between the Amīr and 
French officers, and that he was undoubtedly impressed by the technical advances he 
                                                 
134 Charles Henry Churchill, Ḥayāt al-Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir, trans. Abu al-Qāsim Saʿd Allāh (Tunis: al-Dār 
al-Tūnisīyyah lil-Nashi, 1974), 275-276. 
 
135 Charles Henry Churchill, The Life of Abdel Kader, Ex-Sultan of the Arabs of Algeria; Written from His 
Own Dictation, and Compiled from Other Authentic Sources (London: Chapman and Hall, 1867), 303-304. 
59 
 
witnessed at the International Exhibition.  Moreover, it clearly conveys his astute 
realization that these projects on display were the fruits of reason and intellect.  But that 
said, nowhere in this passage does he assign or acquiesce ownership of the intellectual 
methodology undergirding these innovations to the French, or to Europe.  Indeed, from 
this passage, we cannot intelligently discern much of anything about the Amīr’s attitude 
toward “Western Civilization,” particularly given that the entity in question is left so 
nebulous and ill-defined by Weismann.  Weismann’s assertion here, then, reads as 
reductionist, and ultimately unsupported by the evidence he presents.   
 Yet despite not having adequately justified the claim, Weismann continues, 
throughout the corpus of his writings, to ground his analysis of the Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir 
al-Jazāʾirī on the presupposition that the Amīr capitulated rationalism as having 
originated in the West.  As we have seen, the sources he has cited thus far have not 
adequately supported this position, and some (namely in the Tuḥfat al-zaʾir) ostensibly 
contradict it.  Nonetheless, moving forward Weismann does even more of a disservice to 
his cause, by continuing to argue this position without offering any qualifying references 
for it whatsoever.  For instance, in explaining the Amīr’s sense of mission to rescue his 
coreligionists from certain crisis, Weismann asserts that ʿAbd al-Qādir, unlike his 
predecessor Shaykh Khālid, perceptively “realized that this regression could not any 
more be explained solely by the internal weakness of the Muslim world, but rather was 
principally due to the undeniable superiority achieved by the European Powers.”136  
Realizing as much, he thus “sought to integrate his profound religious faith with the 
rationalist mode of thinking underlying the achievements of the West” as the basis of his 
reform methodology, urging his fellow Muslims “of the necessity to abandon the practice 
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of blind imitation which so pervaded their scholarship in the latter generations and to 
make use of their own reason, as the Europeans did.” 137  This is not to suggest, the 
argument continues, a blanket adoption of Western rationalism in all its facets: 
“preservation of Islam in an age of Western supremacy,” required “acquir[ing] the 
practical sciences which provided the West with its power” while firmly excluding the 
Western rational method from the revealed sciences, lest it lead to skepticism and 
disaffection from religion as it did in Europe.138  Or, put another way, “the Islamic 
response to the Western rationalist challenge must begin with reforming Muslim 
orthodoxy from within,”139 by “adopt[ing] the Western rationalist approach to worldly 
affairs while, at the same time, barring it from the religious sciences, particularly 
theology."140  
 In each of the selections quoted above, Weismann fails to offer a single footnote 
or reference to ground his assertions.  Nevertheless, Weismann continues throughout the 
entirety of his writings to inject Europe and the West as ʿAbd al-Qādir’s primary referent.  
Weismann’s descriptions and explications of the Amīr’s reform methodology, 
unsurprisingly, are repeatedly peppered with this tendency.  The first scheme in this 
reform system, Weismann begins, is “an emphasis on the importance of science for 
human well-being, which reflected ʿAbd al-Qādir’s recognition of the material 
supremacy achieved by Europe and the Muslims’ need to appropriate it.”141  The second 
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scheme in this tripartite reform system, he continues, is compassion toward Christians, 
“which expressed his still basically religious perception of the West.”142  Weismann 
explains the third and final scheme, the call to shun politics, in the context of the Muslim 
commandment to remove evil whenever possible.  As I mentioned earlier, ʿAbd al-Qādir 
deemed Sufis exempt from this requirement altogether.  After establishing as much, 
Weismann explains the phenomenon as being “clearly a call to completely shun politics, 
which reflected ʿAbd al-Qādir's readiness to overlook the Westernizing thrust of the late 
Tanzimat statesmen for the sake of modernization.”143  Once again, Weismann here 
offers no footnotes or references at all to justify framing ʿAbd al-Qādir’s religious reform 
system in binary opposition to Europe or the West, or of suggesting the Amīr’s interest in 
the Tanzimat reforms lay in its purportedly “Westernizing thrust”; a Western referent is 
simply assumed a priori.   
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I hoped to provide a succinct overview of the Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir 
al-Jazāʾirī’s spiritual ripening, and the overall tenets of the methodology of religious 
renewal as he articulated them in his writings—particularly in his Kitāb al-Mawāqif.  
Against this backdrop, the implications of the Mawāqif’s reception in Western 
historiography become far more evident: the Amīr’s interest in religious and spiritual 
renewal, the secondary literature seems to assert, is ultimately predicated on a desire to 
emulate a rationalist worldview that originated in the West.  Yet as we have seen, 
particularly in the work of Itzchak Weismann, the evidence presented thus far does not 
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seem to support or justify this presupposition, and in some cases seems to outright 
contradict it.  Given as much, these historiographical accounts ultimately offer an 
incomplete understanding of how ʿAbd al-Qādir’s truly conceptualized his system of 
spiritual renewal—particularly as it relates to the West—in point of actual fact.   
 Given the limitations of the existing secondary literature, the only way to more 
fully discern the nuances of the Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir’s spiritual thought process is to 
consult the Mawāqif themselves.  As I mentioned previously, the brevity of this thesis 
does not allow for a full reading of the Mawāqif in their entirety, so as a compromise I 
will do a selective reading, based on the Mawāqif cited in the historiographical 
literature—particularly in the accounts offered by Itzchak Weismann.  From this primary 
source analysis, we can hopefully make more intelligent sense of the Amīr’s 
conceptualization of religious reform.  In particular, we can hopefully better discern how, 
if at all, he conceptualizes the West in the formulation of his spiritual weltanschauung.  
That is to say, did he view the rationalist method he sought to inculcate among his co-
religionists—as articulated in his understanding of istiʿdād—as originating from Western 
civilization?  Or did he view it as an organic part of his own Islamic tradition?  Or is his 
attitude in this respect not altogether transparent?  In other words, did the Amīr see the 
West, or Western civilization, as his referent when constructing and conceptualizing his 
reform methodology?  It is to this question that we shall turn in the next chapter.   
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Chapter 3: ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī in his own words: A study of the 
Kitāb al-Mawāqif 
 At face value, the Kitāb al-Mawāqif does not seem to operate on any particular 
organizational logic.  That is to say, recurring themes and topics of spiritual inquiry do 
not appear to be grouped into similar sections of the volume.  Instead, it proceeds with 
numbered aphorisms (mawāqif) appearing in ascending order, without any given mawqif 
necessarily bearing any connection with the mawqif that preceded it.  This lack of 
thematic continuity in the text’s arrangement makes it somewhat elusive to focus on a 
particular area of the Amīr’s intellectual inquiry—in this case, his attitude toward reason.  
That said, even when limited to the relevant sections of the Kitāb al-Mawāqif cited by 
Weismann, the material is rich enough to provide a critical insight into the matter at hand.  
To be clear, this reading is not comprehensive, but it nonetheless offers an instructive 
vista into the Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir’s understanding of religious reform, and in particular, 
how the West factors into his spiritual calculus. 
As I intimated in the last chapter, ʿAbd al-Qādir’s taking up of the Akbarīyya 
mantle was not incidental, but was part of an impassioned attempt to confront the 
profound social and spiritual challenges facing the Muslims of his day.  Dismayed and 
distressed at the beleaguered state of the Muslim umma, the Amīr was prompted by an 
urgent sense to take the lead in changing the Muslim condition.  In fact, as we shall see 
shortly, he goes so far as indicate that he considered himself specifically ordained for this 
arduous task.  This urgent sense of mission ultimately led him to embrace the thought of 
Ibn ʿArabī as the solution the existential challenges facing the umma.   
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The question then becomes, what prompted the Amīr’s sense of distress?  What in 
the Muslim condition of his day was so deficient or lacking to lead to his spiritual 
awakening in this respect in the first place?  According to Itzchak Weismann’s accounts, 
as we have seen in the last chapter, this deficiency ʿAbd al-Qādir saw in his religious 
community reflected his realization of Europe’s having gained supremacy over the 
Muslims, through its use and embrace of reason, and through the material advancements 
offered by the natural sciences.  His spiritual mission in this respect, it follows, was 
motivated by a desire to overcome the stagnation befalling the Muslims due to their 
having insufficiently embraced European rationalism.  But as we shall see shortly, a 
careful reading of the Amīr’s own words on this matter in the Mawāqif suggests that his 
sense of mission, and his angst over the state of the Muslim umma at the time, was far 
more sophisticated than a mere desire to master any winning European formula for 
success.   
 
The Roots of ʿAbd al-Qādir’s Spiritual Vocation 
 In his article published in Die Welt des Islams, Itzchak Weismann begins to 
articulate the urgent sense of calling that underlay the Amīr’s spiritual thought.  More 
specifically, he suggests that the Kitāb al-Mawāqif was a project motivated by the 
realization of European rational dominance over the Muslims, and the pressing desire to 
protect the umma from being subdued entirely.  More specifically, he argues:  
ʿAbd al-Qādir’s collection of spiritual experiences after 
settling in Damascus, which is entirely stamped in the 
theosophy of Ibn ʿArabī, indicates his urgent sense of 
mission, derived from his realization of European 
supremacy over the Muslim world.  To preserve the 
Muslim faith in the face of the rationalist challenge of the 
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West, ʿAbd al-Qādir urged his co-religionists to approach 
the West and master the practical sciences that lay at the 
base of its power.  On the other hand, he warned them to 
completely remove rationalism from the religious sciences, 
lest it would lead, like it had done in Europe, to disbelief.144 
 
To bolster his argument, Weismann cites three separate sections of the Mawāqif.  More 
specifically, in the first sentence, immediately after the word “mission,” he cites pages 
142-3 of volume 1 of the Mawāqif.  Then, at the end of the second and third sentences, he 
cites, respectively, page 86 and 236 of the same volume.  But shockingly, these passages 
he cites offer very little justification for the position he forwards here.   
 Pages 142-3 of volume 1 mark the first two pages of mawqif 83.  In this mawqif, 
surprisingly enough, ʿAbd al-Qādir makes no reference whatsoever to his sense of 
spiritual mission, much less of it being derived from European supremacy over the 
Muslim world!  Rather, the passage revolves around concept of blessing (niʿma) from an 
Islamic framework.  More specifically, the Amīr suggests that knowledge itself is a 
blessing—the greatest blessing, in fact.  He then goes on to subdivide knowledge into two 
categories: the knowledge of practice, and the knowledge of speech.145  There is no 
discussion at all in this passage of the Amīr’s coming to spiritual maturity, or of the 
motivations behind his taking up the mantle of reformism in the first place.  
 Weismann’s interpretation of page 86 of the Mawāqif, moreover, is equally 
problematic, as it as well bears no ostensible relevance to the actual content of the text 
being quoted.  This passage refers to a discussion of causality more broadly, in which the 
Amīr creates a categorical distinction between the fortunes of the material world and 
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145 ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī, “Mawqif 83,” in Kitāb al-Mawāqif fī al-Waʿẓ wa-al-Irshād (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat 
al-Shabāb, 1911), 1: 142-143. 
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those of the spiritual world.  In the context of this discussion, he states that the fortune 
that is bestowed from God encapsulates both the fortunate of the spirit and the intellect, 
and that this has been proven in the worldly sciences and in the spiritual sciences.146  
There is no discussion at all in this passage of the Amīr’s spiritual maturation, of his 
engagement with the West, or of his urging his co-religionists to engage the “practical 
sciences that lay at the base of its power.”  In short, the passage Weismann quotes has no 
palpable relevance whatsoever to the position he puts forward.   
 In the final passage Weismann quotes here, fortunately, the content of the text 
being referenced does not seem altogether irrelevant.  But even then, the source does not 
seem to go as far as he suggests.  As Weismann intimates, in page 236 of volume 1 of the 
Mawāqif ʿAbd al-Qādir indeed does go so far as suggest that the use of reason is not 
without its limits.  More specifically, he cautions his reader that the benefits of reason are 
wholly inferior to the knowledge acquired through the process of spiritual unveiling.147  
That said, he makes no reference to Europe or European unbelief here.  He does refer to 
“freethinkers and naturalists” (al-dahrīyya wa l-ṭabāʿīya) as being particularly 
susceptible to this excessive reliance on reason, but it is unclear whether this is intended 
to refer to Europeans as such.  Elsewhere Weismann argues that this is the case, claiming 
in his book that these two terms “in ʿAbd al-Qādir's time came to denote the Westerners 
and their Muslim imitators.”148  Unfortunately Weismann does little to justify the 
assertion, so barring a more expansive literary review of Arabic terminology in 
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147 Idem., “Mawqif 118,” in Kitāb al-Mawāqif fī al-Waʿẓ wa-al-Irshād (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Shabāb, 1911), 
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nineteenth-century Syria, its veracity is unclear.  And even assuming that these two terms 
did legitimately refer to “Westerners and their Muslim imitators,” as he suggests, the 
Amīr’s commentary here in totality nonetheless has little to do with his motivations for 
embarking on his campaign of religious renewal.  In other words, the sections of the 
Mawāqif Weismann cites here simply do not support the position he puts forward, for 
they don’t give his reader any conclusive understanding of the Amīr’s motivations for 
taking up the mantle of spiritual reform.   
 What, then, are we to make of ʿAbd al-Qādir’s motivations for embarking on this 
journey?  Fortunately, elsewhere Weismann makes references to passages of the Mawāqif 
that indeed deal with this critical issue, and do so profusely.  In particular, in his book he 
makes reference to the Amīr’s dream featuring none other than Ibn ʿArabī himself, which 
rather succinctly delineates some of the concerns we seek to address here.  I briefly 
summarized this dream and its implications in the last chapter, but for the sake of 
extracting the full interpretative possibility of the epochal event, I will translate it here in 
part.  In mawqif 346, ʿAbd al-Qādir sees Ibn ʿArabi in the form of a lion with a large 
chain in its paw.  Then, the beast commanded the Amīr to put his hand in its mouth, and 
upon doing so, the lion reverted to the great master’s human form.  Though in this 
instance, he was utterly incoherent and confused (majdhūb), repeatedly uttering that he 
was about to die, before ultimately falling to the floor.  After describing the dream, the 
Amīr offers his interpretation of its significance:  
The chain in its left (paw) referred to the Islamic 
sharīʿah…His appearance as a deranged man referred to 
the troubles of the time, and the loss of moderation amidst 
great changes.  Finally, his proclamation of death signified 
a deep sense of regret over what had become of Islam, with 
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the Muslims defying the commandments of their Lord and 
their Prophet, and shunning their religion.149 
 
 From this dream, we see no indication whatsoever that ʿAbd al-Qādir’s spiritual 
mission was derived from any recognition of European material supremacy.  The Amīr 
indeed appears motivated by a sense of urgency and vision, but as he states, this urgency 
is derived from the fact that the Muslims have lost their commitment to their own 
tradition.  If the Amīr’s primary lamentation is that Muslims have been insufficiently 
committed to their religion in the aftermath of tumultuous changes, it simply does not 
make sense to suggest that he would subsequently be urging his co-religionists to adopt 
or appropriate methods of a wholly different tradition (that is, the Western tradition 
Weismann speaks of) as a viable solution to the problems the umma now faces.  ʿAbd al-
Qādir’s preoccupation with reforming the Muslim condition, in fact, seems to have little 
to do with any European referent to speak of.  Whatever the details of the solution he 
seems to advocate for Muslim reform, it seems from the text thus far that he intends to 
extract it organically from the Islamic heritage itself, rather than borrow from an 
intellectual source he regards as foreign.   
With that said, though we now have a more informed understanding of ʿAbd al-
Qādir’s motivations for undertaking his spiritual mission, what I have presented thus far 
tells us little about how he plans on rectifying the ills befalling Muslims of his day.  To 
fully grasp this aspect of the Amīr’s thought process, we must explore the intricacies of 
his reform methodology as he laid it out.  It is to this that I shall now turn.  As I intimated 
in the last chapter, his unique understanding of the Qurʿān as perpetually offering new 
insights to successive generations is paramount to his spiritual worldview.   
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The Qurʿān as Source for Perpetual Renewal 
 In the very first mawqif, ʿAbd al-Qādir reveals to his reader the methodological 
backbone of his system of spiritual renewal.  As I briefly summarized in the last chapter, 
he saw in the Qurʿān a source of perpetual religious renewal, with each generation of Sufi 
saints receiving additional meanings of its verses.  He opens the mawqif by quoting verse 
33:21 of the Qurʿān, “Verily, you have in the Messenger of Allah an excellent model.”  
Then, in explaining how he came to learn this verse, he reveals the “secret spiritual 
modality” that came to inform his knowledge of scripture more broadly:  
I have received this precious verse through a secret spiritual 
modality.  In fact, when Allah wishes to communicate an 
order or an interdiction to me, announce good news or warn 
me, teach me some knowledge or respond to a question that 
I have asked Him, it is His practice to remove me from 
myself—without my exterior form being affected—and 
then to project on me that which He wishes through a 
subtle allusion contained in a verse of the Koran.  After 
that, He restores me to myself, furnished with this verse, 
consoled and filled.  He then sends me an inspiration 
concerning that which He wished to tell me through this 
verse.  The communication of this verse proceeds without 
sound or letter and cannot be assigned to any direction of 
space.150 
 
Thus, the Amīr acquires additional layers of meaning of scripture through unveiling from 
the Divine Himself.  He goes on to explain that he had received knowledge of half of the 
Qurʿān through this mystical unveiling, and had hoped to be revealed the entirety of the 
holy book in his lifetime in the same vein.  All the verses he addresses in the Mawāqif, 
moreover, were received through this process.   
 Furthermore, though he admits here to having acquired new meanings of the 
Qurʿān hitherto unknown by his coreligionists, he makes clear that the mystical unveiling 
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he speaks of is not a substitute for previously revealed knowledge.  Indeed, the Sufis in 
no way purport to compromise the timelessness of scripture in its literal sense. Instead, 
while respecting the literal meaning of the text, they purport to uncover additional 
meanings that augment rather than replace previously revealed meanings:  
The People of our Way—may Allah be pleased with 
them!—have never claimed to bring anything new in 
spiritual matters, but simply to discover new meanings in 
the immemorial Tradition…Everything which is found on 
this page, and everything which is found in these Mawāqif, 
is of this nature.  It is Allah who speaks the Truth, and it is 
He who guides on the straight path.151 
 
Having established as much, he returns to the Qurʿānic verse cited in the opening 
of the mawqif, and explicates the richness of its meanings acquired through this process 
of mystical revealing.  Deeming this edification to the Prophet of Islam as an “immense 
ocean, without beginning or end,” the Amīr sees in it the source for all the sciences, both 
the religious and the worldly sciences alike.152  For at first glance, he argues, the verse 
concerns itself with God’s relationship and attitude toward Muḥammad.  From that 
perspective, the verse concerns itself with knowing Allah and His infinite attributes:  
From this point of view the introductory verse embraces 
infinite and inaccessible knowledge; comprising knowledge 
of Allah, His attributes, His independence with respect to 
His creatures and their dependence on Him; and knowledge  
of the Messengers, what is incumbent on them, what is 
permitted to them and what is prohibited to them; and 
knowledge of the divine Wisdom in their creation, and the 
procession of this world and of the other world.153 
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Accordingly, insofar as the verse from this viewpoint deals with discerning knowledge of 
the Divine, in this sense it forms the basis for the science of dialectical theology.  Yet this 
is only the beginning of the verse’s interpretative possibilities.  From another perspective, 
it instead concerns itself with Muḥammad’s attitude toward Allah, and by extension the 
process of worship and devotion embedded in that relationship between the Creator and 
his Messenger:   
From another point of view this model concerns the 
comportment of the Messenger towards his Lord, the 
perfect Realization of what servitude means, the 
accomplishment of everything which Lordship demands, 
his total dependence upon God (al-faqr ilayhi) and his total 
abandonment to Him in all things, his submission to His 
power and his satisfaction in everything He decrees, his 
gratitude for the graces which He grants and his patience in 
the trials which He inflicts.  This aspect of the verse relates 
to the limitless and innumerable sciences concerning the 
sacred Law and concerning acts of worship and the 
ordinary acts of existence, practices leading to salvation 
and practices leading to perdition.154 
 
The verse from this perspective, then, forms the basis for the sciences of religious law 
and worship.   
 Yet the Amīr does not stop here.  Just as the supplication of the Messenger of 
Allah as an excellent model speaks to Muḥammad’s relationship with God (and vice 
versa), ʿAbd al-Qādir also sees in this verse an encapsulation of the Prophet’s relationship 
with humanity more broadly.  And in the nuances of this relationship, he acquires an even 
deeper understanding of the foundations of the sciences.  In the attitude of man towards 
Allah’s Apostle, he sees the basis of knowledge of the Prophet’s merits and virtues:  
From yet another point of view, this relates to the 
comportment of men toward the Prophet...This category of 
interpretation of this verse is connected to the inexhaustible 
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knowledge of the virtues of the Prophet and of his 
teachings and the virtues and teachings of the other 
prophets and gnostics, and of the trials which they all had 
to endure from those who treated them as impostors.155 
 
This interpretation of the verse, in other words, is connected to the science of discerning 
Prophetic conduct and teachings, both of Muḥammad and the Prophets that preceded him.  
Additionally, this science deals with the history and hagiography of the great saints 
(awliyāʿ), and of their virtues and attributes.   
 Finally, ʿAbd al-Qādir interprets this Qurʿānic verse, from the perspective of the 
Prophet’s attitude toward humanity, as offering a vista into the practical sciences of 
proper human conduct in the dunyā.  More specifically:  
This can also be understood as the comportment of the 
Prophet toward the creatures, of the love which he had for 
them, of the good that he wished for them...This aspect of 
the verse is connected to the knowledge—which pens 
cannot transcribe nor minds enclose—of the noble 
attributes and perfect virtues, and to the science of the 
governing of men in the affairs of religion as well as the 
affairs of the world with a view toward good order and the 
prosperity of the universe and the happiness of the elect. 
(165) 
 
From this prism, then, the same Qurʿānic verse that provides us with basis of the religious 
sciences—of theology, Islamic law, Sufism, and the study of Prophet and saintly 
aḥadīth—also provides us with an ethical blueprint for how to conduct ourselves and 
govern our affairs in the ephemeral world.   
In beginning the Mawāqif with this example, the Amīr sets the stage for a 
theosophical approach that remains firmly embedded in the scriptural tradition, yet 
simultaneously allows him the flexibility to challenge the zeitgeist of his day.  Moreover, 
from the very inception of the Mawāqif we see a commitment to addressing material 
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concerns of the dunyā.  This is to say, ʿAbd al-Qādir was not an armchair philosopher 
exclusively concerned with the mystical path to salvation, but in his spiritual approach he 
saw it equally necessary to weigh in on the ephemeral concerns facing the Muslims of his 
day.  In this mawqif he expresses a strong interest in man learning proper conduct in 
governing the affairs of the world.  And as we saw briefly in the last chapter, he saw 
proper worldly conduct of man governed not by fatalism, but by man’s essential and 
innate predispositions, or man’s istiʿdād.   
 
Istiʿdād, Free Will, and Reason 
It is on this basis, of man acting according to his istiʿdād, that ʿAbd al-Qādir bases 
his understanding of justice, and of free will.  In Mawqif 23, he quotes verse 18:46 of the 
Qurʿān (Sūrat al-Kahf), which refers to the idea that thy Lord does not harm or oppress 
anyone (wa lā yaḍhlimu rabbuka aḥadan), and then goes on to qualify that the Lord will 
never be unjust because created things, through their own capacities (istiʿdādāt), seek out 
from Him to manifest in them that which they necessitate.  This capacity, moreover, is 
universal, is neither made nor created, and is not borne of created beings’ actions 
themselves.156  The Lord’s being just, then, is inherent in the pre-determined decree of 
nature.  For although in His act He has absolute choice, he can nonetheless “only act 
according to the measure of the essential predispositions (istiʿdādāt) and according to the 
nature of the receptacles of His theophanies.  This conditioning by the essences of the 
things imposes itself on God Himself and it is in conformity with what they are that He 
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manifests Himself in them.”157 Thus, it follows that (emphasis mine) “[i]n everything His 
act and His choice are according to what the essence of that thing demands.”158   
In arguing that the Lord acts precisely according to the nature and essence of His 
theophanies, ʿAbd al-Qādir is suggesting that the worldly aspect of His revelation 
requires man to be self-reliant, rather than seek from God that which does not suit him.  
In this “imaginary reality” of ʿAbd-al-Qādir’s theosophical system of waḥdat al-wujūd, 
man must work within reality rather than seek refuge from God to change it for him.  For 
man, this implies engaging the world discursively, using his natural intellect, as that is his 
istiʿdād.159  It is on this basis, it seems, that ʿAbd al-Qādir has grounded his interest in the 
use of the worldly sciences as necessary for Muslim advancement.   
It is also on this basis, Weismann, argues, that the Amīr justifies the need to 
borrow the fruits of European reason.  As man must accept reality for what it is, rather 
than seek divine intervention to alter it, Muslims of ʿAbd al-Qādir’s day were thus 
required to accept the reality of Europe’s rationalist method having led to its having 
achieved superiority over the Muslim umma.  ʿAbd al-Qādir’s interest in science for 
human well-being, the argument follows, “reflected ʿAbd al-Qādir’s recognition of the 
material supremacy achieved by Europe and the Muslims’ need to appropriate it.”160  But 
a close reading of mawqif 364—which Weismann himself cites, as I will discuss 
shortly—casts serious doubt on this being the case.  Here he is asked by some of his 
companions whether Muslims should, given their having been defeated by the Christians, 
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adopt their mannerisms and beliefs.  The Amīr’s response is less than encouraging.  I 
translate this exchange in part below:  
One of my companions asked me why Muslims clamor to 
imitate the Christians, or to take them up as role models in 
their habits, their clothing, and their dietary habits.  Or 
better yet, take up their actions and reposes, their rulings, or 
their laws [literally, their sharīʿah].   
And I responded: most people, except the select of God’s 
servants, think that if the disbelievers become dominant 
over the Muslims, that this is indicative of God’s aid of 
them over the Muslims.  But this is false.  For the Muslim, 
when he disobeys the commandment of his Lord, and 
rejects the law of his Prophet, God most High forsakes him.  
So, as for when the Muslim and disbeliever face off, the 
Divine Name takes control of the Muslim who is unfaithful, 
and throws fear in his heart.  And the Muslim is summarily 
vanquished.161 
 
ʿAbd al-Qādir’s position in this passage is indirect, but nonetheless readily 
discernible with respect to the question he is posed by his disciple.  That is, when asked 
why Muslims have been clamoring to mimic the Christians in their mannerisms and 
rulings, he responds by pointing out that a critical mass of Muslims have falsely come to 
the belief that Christian material supremacy is an indication of their having gained favor 
over them, hence the Muslim desire to imitate what they think are the methods behind 
European success.  But by immediately responding that this is a false presupposition, and 
immediately thereafter adding that God will forsake the Muslim who rejects the 
commandment of his Lord, he is clearly suggesting that imitation of the Christians in this 
respect amounts to rejecting the commandment of the Lord, in point of fact.  In other 
words, despite the material advantage the Christians have gained over the Muslims—a 
fact he concedes—ʿAbd al-Qādir unequivocally does not advocate or endorse mimicking 
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them, either in their style and conduct on in their rulings and affairs—that is, their 
sharīʿah.  Doing so, he cautions, is to disobey the example set down by their own Prophet 
(sharīʿah nabīhi), which will inevitably lead to Muslims being forsaken by their Lord, 
and ultimately defeated.   
Nonetheless, in Weismann’s explication of this mawqif, he offers no such 
acknowledgment that the Amīr essentially disavowed appropriating the knowledge and 
ways of the Christians for material gain.  Instead, as if sidestepping this declaration 
altogether, he proceeds with his previous argument uninterrupted, insisting that ʿAbd al-
Qādir’s emphasis on acquiescing to reality led him in turn to concede the reality of 
European supremacy over the Muslims—and the rational method undergirding that 
material supremacy.   
The same stress on the necessity of acquiescing to reality 
helps ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī to justify the growing 
European supremacy over the Muslim peoples.  This is 
discernible in his reply to the question of why Muslims 
praise whatever comes from the Christians and imitate 
them in all their manners and habits. ʿAbd al-Qādir first 
gives the traditional answer that since the Muslims had 
neglected the shariʿa and amirs—who came to believe that 
the defeats of their armies stemmed from the customs and 
conduct of the unbelievers, proceeded to imitate them.  
Because the questioner was not convinced by this external 
explanation, ʿAbd al-Qādir adds an inner one: The reason 
for the changes in the situation of the world is the changes 
in the manifestations of the divine names.  Divinity in Itself 
needs these changes, be they for the good or for the bad.  
The divine names act upon and influence the creatures, 
each one of them in its own way.  All the affairs of the 
creatures depend upon the laws of the divine names, 
symbolize them, and constitute their consequences.  
Beyond that nothing can be said or asked.  It is impossible 
to explain the actions of God in His creatures, and all that 
can be said is that generally every thing receives its 
share.162 
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It seems that Weismann has neglected to pay full attention to the very clear normative 
implications of the Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir’s statements in this passage.  He acknowledges 
that the Amīr considers both Muslim neglect for their sharīʿah and his defeated soldiers 
having been enamored with their enemies’ methods as dually responsible for Muslim 
desire to imitate the Christians.  Yet surprisingly, he fails to acknowledge the inextricable 
connection ʿAbd al-Qādir very clearly forged between the two phenomena in the 
passage—that the desire to emulate the (materially advanced) disbelievers in this respect 
is in fact to defy the sharīʿah.  Indeed, the Amīr does not present these two issues 
simultaneously, as Weismann seems to suggest by larding them together: first he brings 
up the fact that a critical mass of Muslims carries the belief that the disbelievers’ material 
dominance over the Muslims is an indication of God’s favor of them—hence the Muslim 
desire to imitate their methods.  Only immediately afterwards—not concomitantly, as 
Weismann presents in his analysis—does the Amīr goes on to explicitly declare this 
assumption to be false, because the Muslim who disobeys the dictates of the sharīʿah is 
forsaken by his Lord.   
As I mentioned above, the linear progression of the Amīr’s positions in this 
fashion very clearly suggests his establishing a concordance between imitation of the 
Christians on the one hand and disobeying the sharīʿah on the other.  In other words, the 
Amīr emphatically disapproves of this practice of mimicking the disbelievers and their 
methods, irrespective of their material advantage; from this it would follow that he would 
disapprove of appropriating the epistemological framework of rationalism from which 
their material success allegedly derives.  It is quite baffling, then, for Weismann to 
entirely ignore as much.  In fact, he seemingly deemphasizes the significance of this 
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concordance, by very hurriedly glossing over it as he moves on to discuss the changing 
manifestations of the Divine Names, which takes the lion’s share of his attention in his 
analysis.  This is not to suggest that the issue of the Divine Names is not deeply relevant 
to ʿAbd al-Qādir’s analysis—indeed it is, and Weismann’s analysis in this respect winds 
up being quite illuminating.163  But his having steamrolled through the equally important 
first explanation offered by ʿAbd al-Qādir to the question posed by his devotee seems to 
suggest an error of omission on his part.  Thus, Weismann might be somewhat 
presumptuous here in reducing ʿAbd al-Qādir’s understanding of istiʿdād to acquiescence 
of European supremacy, or of appropriation of the rationalism allegedly behind that 
supremacy.  
But as we conclude this analysis, we see that this is not an isolated incident, for 
Weismann has an established tendency to link istiʿdād with concession of Western 
supremacy by the Amīr.  That is, repeatedly throughout his analysis he draws an 
association between the Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir’s conceptualization of istiʿdād and his 
alleged support for European rationalism, without at any given point establishing that 
ʿAbd al-Qādir conceded rationalism as European or Western in the first place.  We see 
this tendency again in his explanation of the Amīr’s attitude toward government.  As I 
explained in the last chapter, ʿAbd al-Qādir interpreted the famous Prophetic Ḥadīth 
commanding believers to oppose evil by the hand, by the tongue, or at the very least by 
                                                 
163 As full disclosure, I did not translate this section of the passage concerning the Divine Names, namely 
because of my lack of familiarity with the deeply complicated metaphysics behind the phenomenon.  For 
me to then attempt to analyze it would be to do the content of the text a great disservice.   
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the heart as inapplicable to the Sufis.164  Rather, only political rulers, the ʿulamāʾ, and 
common believers are obligated to obey this commandment:  
It is incumbent upon the sultan and the holders of authority, 
who have been established precisely for this purpose, that 
they oppose evil by force.  The opposition of evil by speech 
belongs to the doctors of the Law whose knowledge is 
recognized and who manifest it in public.  Lastly, to oppose 
evil by the heart is proper to ordinary believers once they 
are able to recognize what is evil and this opposition by the 
heart consists in reproving in their interior hearths those 
acts or those words which the religion prohibits.  For the 
ordinary believer that is part of his faith in the 
Muḥammadan revelation.165  
 
But for the spiritual elite, he explains, this is not necessary.  Because for them, to oppose 
themselves to evil is ultimately to violate or deny the ultimate unity of God:  
But if he does not belong to one of these three groups, 
opposing himself to evil amounts to associating with God 
something other than Him and to denying the divine 
Unicity.  In fact, the divine Unicity excludes the opposition 
to evil by the heart, since it excludes the attribution of the 
act to its [apparent] agent.  There is no being which could 
“oppose itself,” since the one single Reality is the unique 
Agent of all the acts which are attributed to creatures.  If 
there were an agent other than God, there would no longer 
be the divine Unicity.  That which provokes the opposition 
to evil by the heart is the existence of the act, but there is 
no Agent [for this act] if it is not God.166   
 
Weismann’s analysis and interpretation of this passage is both astute and 
intelligent.  But his findings at the end of this analysis seem based on the same 
                                                 
164 The text of the Ḥadīth, as translated by Michel Chodkiewicz in his Spiritual Writings of AmirʿAbd Al-
Kader, 147, reads:  
It is reported in the Ṣaḥīḥ that the Prophet—On him be Grace and Peace!—said: “If one of you becomes 
aware of an evil, let him oppose it by force (literally: ‘by his hand’); and if he cannot do that, let him 
oppose it by speech; and if he cannot do that, let him oppose it by his heart—this is the least which faith 
demands.” 
 
165 ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī, “Mawqif 133,” in in The Spiritual Writings of Amir ʿAbd Al-Kader, 147. 
 
166 Ibid., 149. 
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presuppositions we witnessed earlier regarding istiʿdād.  He begins his explication here 
sedately enough: “The Sufis, however, do not belong in ʿAbd al-Qādir’s eyes to any of 
these three categories and, therefore, are not obliged to remove evil at all!  They behold 
of the Real Actor and realize that creatures are mere accidents into which He supplants 
actions, things, and intentions, without their participation.”167  But from this analysis he 
proceeds to draw a conclusion that doesn’t seem particularly grounded in the text itself: 
“This was clearly a call to completely shun politics, which reflected ʿAbd al-Qādir’s 
readiness to overlook the Westernizing thrust of the late Tanzimat statesmen for the sake 
of modernization.”168  As I mentioned in the last chapter, ʿAbd al-Qādir’s command to 
avoid politics was a central aspect of his reform methodology, and dissatisfaction with 
this brand of political quietism led his cohort to ultimately defer to the more activist 
thought of Ibn Taymiyya following his death.  But how, from the text as presented, can 
we discern that this call to shun politics reflect the Amīr’s desire or readiness to overlook 
the allegedly Westernizing tendencies of the Tanzimat reforms?  Needless to say, 
Weismann leaves these Westernizing tendencies in question horribly ill-defined, which 
makes it difficult to scrutinize the veracity of the claim.  But more importantly, it seems 
that Weismann is again relying on the presupposition that ʿAbd al-Qādir’s insistence on 
self-reliance and acquiescence to reality, by virtue of man’s istiʿdād, necessarily leads to 
his acquiescence of Western superiority, and of the need to borrow the rational method 
responsible for that superiority.  As I have established at length, Weismann simply has 
not sufficiently justified that assertion thus far, so his repeated reliance on it seems deeply 
problematic.   
                                                 
167 Itzchak Weismann, Taste of Modernity, 191.  
 
168 Ibid. 
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Before concluding this section, it is worth mentioning that ʿAbd al-Qādir inserts 
an interesting addendum to this mawqif.  The dictum here is quite ambiguous, but perhaps 
sheds some additional light on how Weismann conceived his analysis of the text.   
This question is one of those which the initiates consider 
the most difficult.  But the gnostic who possesses the sense 
of spiritual discrimination knows how to distinguish the 
places and the circumstances and what each of them 
imposes as an obligation.  To each place, and to each 
moment, he renders what is due.169 
 
The initiates of the spiritual path, then, find this obligation [to shun political affairs] 
among their most difficult, but are able to discern how their particular spiritual 
obligations change as a function of circumstance.  This could in fact imply that the 
circumstances the Muslims of ʿAbd al-Qādir’s day were facing necessitated the tacit (or 
overt) support of this or that political policy, thereby lending some credence to 
Weismann’s claim.  But without more information we simply cannot discern as much.  
And since Weismann offers no other information in support of his analysis,170 at this 
point we can only conclude that his claims are unsubstantiated.   
 
Conclusion 
 In this reading of selected passages from the Kitāb al-Mawāqif—namely those 
used by Itzchak Weismann in his historiographical work—I have a provided a brief yet 
illuminating vista into the spiritual worldview of the Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī.  Two 
observations in particular come to mind from this analysis.  First, from the sample of the 
                                                 
169 ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī, “Mawqif 133,” in in The Spiritual Writings of Amir ʿAbd Al-Kader, 149. 
 
170 A caveat here.  In addition to citing mawqif 133, in the same footnote he also cites page 254 of mawqif 
362.  But the content of that page deals with mostly the same material as mawqif 133, albeit with more 
brevity.  That is, it very succinctly delineates that removing evil by the hand is the responsibility of the 
ruler, by the tongue the responsibility of the ʿulemāʾ, and by the heart the responsibility of the weak in 
imān. 
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Mawāqif I have studied here, it seems that the Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir has thoroughly 
grounded his idea of spiritual renewal in an Islamic milieu.  That is to say, there is simply 
no evidence from the texts analyzed herein that his religious weltanschauung was 
formulated with a European or Western referent in mind.  In fact, he repeatedly cautions 
his reader that the Muslims are facing calamities, and will continue to be forsaken, for 
abandoning their religious heritage, and that mimicking the disbelievers in their 
mannerisms or their rulings will only lead to more adversity.  We saw several attempts by 
Weismann to ground ʿAbd al-Qādir’s spiritual system in contradistinction to the West, 
but these mostly led to dead ends.  Indeed, several of the sources cited—particularly with 
respect to the Amīr’s sense of spiritual awakening and mission—bore no relevance 
whatsoever to the positions Weismann forwarded! 
And furthermore, from the texts we studied here, it is simply not tenable to posit that 
the Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī saw the use or appropriation of Western rationalism as 
central to his reform methodology.  For as I have established at length, the texts we have 
read thus far provide us with no discernible reason to believe that the Amīr conceded 
rationality as Western in the first place.  It is still ultimately possible that there is a grain 
of truth to this assertion, from the totality of all of the Amīr’s written works, but based on 
the sources provided and analyzed herein, the claim does not seem to have much basis in 
point of fact.  Thus, while we cannot draw formative conclusions insofar as this is a 
selected study, we can nonetheless conclude that the analyses offered in the existing 
historiographical literature simply do not remain fully faithful to the sources they employ.  
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 Chapter 4: Theoretical Implications, and Conclusion 
As I bring this project to a close, I am truly amazed at how little scholarly 
attention the Amīr ʿAbd al Qādir al-Jazāʾirī has received as a purveyor of Islamic reform.  
His role as the great Algerian anti-colonial resistance leader is well-documented, and as 
we have seen previously, this stage in his career has been subject to absolutist 
interpretation across several ideological persuasions.  To loyalists of French imperialism, 
he was a religious fanatic bent on establishing a medieval theocracy in Algeria; with his 
defeat, this argument continues, he was properly enlightened by the French civilizing 
mission, as perhaps best evidenced by his heroic rescue of Damascene Christians in 1860.  
To the British, on the other hand, he was elevated to the status of an epic hero, in order to 
delegitimize the enterprise of French colonialism vis-à-vis its British imperial rival.  In 
this context, moreover, contemporary accounts like John Kiser’s recent exalting 
biography of the Amīr, make more sense.171  Extolling ʿAbd al Qādir as a practitioner 
and symbol of “true Jihad,” Kiser’s volume, as part of the Abd el-Kader Education 
Project he heads, was specifically written for the purposes of lionizing the person of the 
Amīr as part of a campaign to curb modern anti-Muslim sentiment.172  Kiser’s account of 
ʿAbd al Qādir, then, has ample precedent.   
Yet even in this panegyric tradition, we see little discussion of the Amīr’s 
contributions to Islamic renewal, his attempts to conceptualize an organically Islamic 
modernity, or his reformulation of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought as part of this revivalist project.  
Indeed, Kiser makes scant reference to ʿAbd al-Qādir’s spiritual reformist predilections, 
                                                 
171 See John Kiser, Commander of the Faithful: The Life and Times of Emir Abd el-Kader (Rhinebeck, NY: 
Monkfish Book Publishing Company, 2010). 
 
172 See, for instance, John Kiser, “True Jihad,” Commander of the Faithful official webpage, accessed 
October 1, 2011, http://www.truejihad.com/pages/true-jihad.php. 
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deferring instead to the events of 1860 as more pertinent to his exile period in Damascus.  
The scholarly literature on the Amīr’s religious reformism, moreover, is similarly 
lacking, with works by Itzchak Weismann and David Dean Commins being among the 
few academic works [in English] available on this period of his life and career.  On one 
hand this is upsetting, as it obscures a profound and dynamic Muslim figure from several 
ongoing discussions in Islamic intellectual history that would likely be enriched by his 
thought.  In particular I refer here to Islamic Modernism, whose better known figures like 
Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad ʿAbduh, and Rashīd Riḍā, as I mentioned 
previously, are already well represented in the scholarly literature.  The absence of the 
Amīr ʿAbd al Qādir al-Jazāʾirī in this regard, in my view, is detrimental and 
impoverishing to these debates.   
 But on the other hand, what I have uncovered thus far in this study about the 
Amīr’s role in Islamic reform is quite exciting, as it suggests several opportunities for 
further study that have thus far gone unexplored.  Needless to say, any further research 
would first require a reading of ʿAbd al-Qādir’s spiritual thought in its totality, beyond 
the glimpse offered in this study.  Once that has been addressed, it would be quite 
interesting to situate ʿAbd al Qādir in the context of the other major figures and 
representatives of Islamic Modernism.  Despite his circumstances having differed 
considerably from Afghānī and ʿAbduh, for instance, all three men seemed especially 
interested in the role of reason and scientific progress in Islamic reform.  Granted, what I 
present here is a crude juxtaposition, but my point is simply to illustrate that despite ʿAbd 
al-Qādir’s peculiar religious and geographical milieu, there nonetheless seems to be both 
a temporal and a conceptual overlap between his religious reformist thought and that of 
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the major figures affiliated with the Islamic modernist trend.  It would be instructive, I 
think, to explore this relationship between the thought processes of these major thinkers 
further, not simply for the sake of drawing shallow symmetrical comparisons, but to 
explore how both the similarities and the particularities of their engagement with the 
same overarching concern—how to appropriately engage the modern world—can 
collectively lead to renewed discussions on this same debate.   
This approach, which Ebrahim Moosa terms “contrapuntal readings,” can lead to 
exciting and hitherto unexplored panoramas on the question of Islam and modernity.  As 
Moosa points out, “we undertake contrapuntal readings when we engage the work of 
some extraordinary writers in order to produce new readings of their work from our 
specific vantage point.”173  By adding the Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir to this discussion of 
Islamic engagements with modernity, what can we say, for instance, about the 
relationship between Sufism and reason in this context?  Figures like ʿAbduh and Riḍā 
chastised the superstitions of popular manifestations of Sufism as diametrically opposed 
to the rational impulse they hoped to inculcate among their followers, whereas ʿAbd al-
Qadir’s reading of the Akbarīyya doctrine was, it seems thus far, precisely what 
motivated him to emphasize reason as fundamental to man’s istiʿdād.  What can we draw 
from these peculiarities in approaching the same overall concern? 
Or, what can the Amīr’s career tell us about the role of first-hand experiential 
engagement with the West in Islamic reform efforts?  Whereas figures like Muḥammad 
ʿAbduh and ʿAllāma Muḥammad Iqbāl of India spent formative time in the West, and 
were partly educated there, ʿAbd al-Qādir’s education was entirely undertaken in the 
                                                 
173 For more on the idea of contrapuntal readings, see Ebrahim Moosa, “Contrapuntal Readings in Muslim 
Thought: Translations and Transitions,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 74, no. 1 (2006): 
107-118. 
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Muslim world, geographically speaking.  Injecting the career and spiritual reformist 
thought of this hitherto neglected nineteenth-century Algerian Sufi would do much to 
enrich the debate over how the Islamic intellectual heritage has and should engage with 
the issue of the modern world.   
Indeed, a contrapuntal reading of the reformist thought of ʿAbd al-Qādir al-
Jazāʾirī could prove fruitful in exploring broader questions concerning human 
potentiality, possibility, and promise—both within and outside a distinctly Islamic 
context.  For instance, I think it would be a very interesting exercise to do a contrapuntal 
reading of ʿAbd al-Qādir’s conceptualization of al-insān al-kāmil, the Perfect Man, in 
conversation both with the interpretation of the same concept (of insān i-kāmil) offered 
by Muḥammad Iqbāl, as well as with Friedrich Nietzsche’s notion of the Übermensch.  
Much as Muḥammad Iqbāl has been repeatedly juxtaposed with Nietzsche for his 
conception of insān i-kāmil, as it deals with the larger issues of human potential 
addressed in the idea of the Übermensch,  ʿAbd al-Qādir’s reading of the idea weighs in 
on precisely these concerns as well.  For ʿAbd al-Qādir, the Perfect Man is the ideal of 
humanity, for he “mirrors God the eternal but not created, on the one hand, and the world, 
the created but not eternal, on the other.  He was created as God’s vicegerent (khalīfa) on 
earth while the entire world is a particularization of what exists in him.”174  Both men, 
moreover, drew explicitly on strands of Akbarīyya doctrine to formulate their 
conceptualizations of mankind’s ideal. 
ʿAbd al-Qādir departs starkly from Iqbāl, though, to the extent that he outright 
rejects the interpretations of fourteenth-century Yemenite scholar and Ibn ʿArabī 
                                                 
174 Itzchak Weismann, “God and the Perfect Man in the Experience of ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī,” Journal 
of the Muhyiddīn Ibn ʿArabī Society 30 (Autumn 2001): 64. 
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exponent ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Jīlī.  Whereas Iqbāl draws heavily on Jīlī in his 
conceptualization of insān i-kāmil, ʿAbd al-Qādir instead argues that Jīlī’s immanent 
explication of Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine is dangerous insofar as it apotheosizes the figure of 
the Perfect Man.  In so doing, ʿAbd al-Qādir feared, Jīlī’s approach would set the stage 
for antinomianism, with charlatan Sufi leaders proclaiming to have reached the status of 
the Perfect Man, and with hapless commoners adopting a fatalistic attitude toward such 
impostors—that is, Jīlī’s interpretation would encourage the cult of saints, and anti-
modernity.175  The points of departure between Iqbāl and ʿAbd al-Qādir in this respect, I 
believe, would make a contrapuntal reading of the two, in conversation with Nietzsche’s 
Übermensch, especially intriguing, and may lead to a richer understanding of human 
ephemeral aptitude more broadly.   
But alas, the available commentary on the Amīr ʿAbd al Qādir al-Jazāʾirī 
essentially forecloses the possibilities for further inquiry into his thought, of the type I 
describe above.  This is not to suggest that I am discarding the scholarly value of the 
work analyzed here by Weismann and Commins in their totality; as full disclosure, it 
would have been unfathomable to have completed this study without the insights offered 
by Weismann’s thought-provoking analysis of the history of religious reform in Syria in 
general, and of the person of ʿAbd al-Qādir in particular.  But in reducing the intellectual 
output of a Muslim anti-colonial resistance leader to an effect of his colonial experience, 
and by unjustifiably injecting a Western/European referent at the center of his worldview, 
scholars like Weismann have done a disservice to the critical study of this figure.   
 As a caveat, it is worth mentioning that analysis of knowledge production in a 
colonial context is often plagued with blind spots like these, with it being often difficult 
                                                 
175 Ibid., 68-69. 
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to separate intellectual inquiry from the colonial milieu in which it operates.176  But even 
then, if Weismann wanted to study an Islamic modernist who based his reform 
methodology on mimicking the West and appropriating its rational methods, there are far 
more apposite figures to choose from.  Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan of India, for instance, is a 
Muslim modernist figure that operated under precisely these auspices, having established 
an educational institute for Muslims, now known as the Aligarh Muslim University, on 
what he perceived to be Western education and sciences.  Insofar as he felt the methods 
of the West were necessary for Muslim progress, Khan went as far as urging his religious 
brethren to support British colonial rule in lieu of seeking their independence.  Indeed, 
figures like Khan, who operated with a Western referent in mind as they contemplated 
Islamic reform, are adequately represented in Muslim intellectual history.  But based on 
the sources analyzed in this study, particularly those consulted by Weismann, the Amīr 
ʿAbd al Qādir al-Jazāʾirī simply does not qualify as one of those figures.     
 The question then becomes, what are the implications of the problematic analyses 
of ʿAbd al Qādir outlined in this study?  Some, like Hamid Dabashi, would argue that the 
assertions made by scholars like Weismann in this respect constitute nothing short of 
committing epistemic violence:  
Only in the mind of incurably racist assumptions is ‘‘the 
West’’ the center of the universe and the whole world its 
periphery. That periphery is already in the center, for that 
center was roaming through its peripheries causing 
calamities and stealing resources. Intermingling of diverse 
communities of sentiments having gathered in ‘‘the West’’ 
                                                 
176 This is a basic problem in postcolonial theory.  See, for instance, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A 
Critique of Post-Colonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1999). 
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from all the colonized lands prevents any essentialist 
assumption about any collectivity anywhere in the world.177 
 
Strong words by Dabashi, for sure.  But I think it might be excessive to brand these 
analyses, or the scholars that produced them, as categorically racist.  For even without 
going that far, we can nonetheless see that the paradigm they are employing is deeply 
problematic.  I will end this study by offering insight into a theoretical paradigm that, in 
my view, more appropriately explains and contextualizes the blind spots we have seen in 
the existing literature on the Amīr and his spiritual reform methodology.   
 I refer here to Dipesh Chakrabarty’s theory of Provincializing Europe.  In this 
thesis, Chakrabarty ascribes the reductionism of the type we saw in Itzchak Weismann’s 
reading of the Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī as neither isolated, nor motivated by spite 
or prejudice, but as endemic to the practice of history-writing itself as we know it.  For 
“history” as an academic discourse continues to place “Europe” as the sovereign subject 
of all histories:  
I have a more perverse proposition to argue.  It is that 
insofar as the academic discourse of history—that is, 
“history” as a discourse produced at the institutional site of 
the university—is concerned, “Europe” remains the 
sovereign, theoretical subject of all histories, including the 
ones we call “Indian,” “Chinese,” “Kenyan,” and so on.  
There is a peculiar way in which all these other histories 
tend to become variations on a master narrative that could 
be called “the history of Europe.”178 
 
And as part and parcel of this master narrative, he continues, “modernity” is assigned by 
default to Europe.  “Europe,” in other words, has become “the primary habitus of the 
                                                 
177 Hamid Dabashi, Islamic Liberation Theology: Resisting the Empire (London: Routledge, 2008), 139. 
178 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 27. 
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modern.”179  Accordingly, the material progress so often associated with the modern 
world is, in turn, localized to Europe as its source of historical origin.  The fact that this 
conception of “Europe” is entirely imagined, and demonstrably so, does not make it lose 
or diminish in currency, for it is structurally and institutionally embedded in the practice 
of historicism: “A certain kind of historicism, the metanarrative of progress, is thus 
deeply embedded in our institutional lives however much we may develop, as individual 
intellectuals, an attitude of incredulity toward such metanarratives.”180 
 The metanarrative of European progress, Chakrabarty continues, persists unabated 
largely due to how the process of historicism conceptualizes the notion of time.  For the 
academic historian, he argues, time is organic, and indistinguishable from the forces of 
nature.  And this naturalized conception of historical time presupposes a secular 
worldview, in which spirits and the “supernatural” can claim no autonomy:  
History’s own time is godless, continuous and, to follow 
Benjamin, empty and homogeneous.  By this I mean that in 
employing modern historical consciousness (whether in 
academic writing or outside of it), we think of a world that, 
in Weber’s description, is already disenchanted.  Gods, 
spirits, and other “supernatural” forces can claim no agency 
in our narratives…The time of human history—as any 
popular book on the evolution of this universe will show—
merges with the time of prehistory, of evolutionary and 
geological changes that go back to the beginning of the 
universe.  It is part of nature.181 
 
The process of historicism, thus, homogenizes historical experiences that do not precisely 
correspond to this secularized and disenchanted narrative, for it presupposes that people 
                                                 
179 Ibid., 43. 
 
180 Ibid., 88. 
 
181 Ibid., 73. 
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exist in a naturalized historical time, which exists a priori, independently of their 
particular cultures and experiences.182 
 Chakrabarty then goes on to offer a counter-narrative based on his unique 
expertise in Bengali labor history.  In so doing, he demonstrates that “modernity” had in 
fact been actualized in Bengal, without Bengali modernity necessarily modeling the 
experience of Europe.  In Bengali modernity, gods and spirits featured prominently, and 
there was no ostensible European referent undergirding or motivating the call for 
modernization.  That is to say, the European or Western experience with industrialization 
was neither viewed as normative, nor was the Bengali modern subject classically 
bourgeois, in the European sense of the term.  But we mustn’t see these tendencies as 
indicative of a lack in Bengali modernity, however justified some critiques of that 
modernity may be—with respect to patriarchy, the valorization of the home, and so forth.  
Those tendencies can be critiqued on their own terms, while remaining cognizant of the 
fact that the particular Bengali experience with modernity operated on its own historical 
consciousness, and not on some presupposed naturalized conception of time with an 
underlying European referent.183   
 It is in the context of Chakrabarty’s thesis, I conclude, that we can best come to 
terms with the treatment of the Amīr ʿAbd al Qādir al-Jazāʾirī and his thought on spiritual 
reform in contemporary historiographical literature.  As I have demonstrated throughout 
this study, historians like Itzchak Weismann seem to have been operating on the premise 
that material progress has its roots in the West, to the point that they were insufficiently 
motivated to justify or ground this assertion.  And a closer look at the Amīr’s own words 
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on the matter suggests that, based on the sources consulted in the existing scholarly 
literature, he emphatically did not subscribe to the same metanarrative of European 
progress.  This misplaced fixation on Europe as the primary habitus of the modern, 
though, is not necessarily an act of intellectual dishonesty on the part of Weismann, but 
may be better understood as part of the institutional framework in which his discipline (of 
academic history-writing) operates.   
Rectifying these odious tendencies in the practice of historicism, moreover, will 
require a commitment to disentangle the totalizing metanarrative of Europe, while 
remaining equally committed to problematizing the local histories we seek to extract 
from that metanarrative.  The goal is not to resort to cultural relativism, or to disregard 
European thought.  After all, European thought, for all its homogenizing tendencies, has 
been a blessing to us all in many respects, and ought to be respected as such.   
In the case of the subject at hand, our task as students of the thought of the Amīr 
ʿAbd al Qādir ought to be to disentangle his very particularized engagement and 
conceptualization of modernity—which, the sources thus far suggest, was couched in a 
distinctly Islamic framework—from the nonexistent European referent thrust upon him 
by scholars like Weismann.  But equally important, we must problematize his experience 
and engagement with modernity, and dissect the contradictions in his thought, while 
resisting the temptation to overemphasize the more admirable aspects of his life—like his 
having saved thousands of Damascene Christians from massacre in 1860.  Just as we 
must hermeneutically engage the events of 1860, we must pay equally close attention to 
the seemingly contradictory policies he occasionally implemented during his rule in 
Algeria.  The goal is not to lionize or the person of the Amīr ʿAbd al Qādir al-Jazāʾirī, but 
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to rescue his organic narrative of engaging modernity from the totalizing tendencies of 
the European master narrative.  And once we have done that, the process of 
contrapuntally engaging this fascinating Islamic modernist reformer can finally begin.   
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